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I. INTRODUCTION
Liability insurance coverage disputes often evolve out of the insurer's duty
to defend the policyholder from suits within the coverage promised by the
insurance contract. When the duty to defend is triggered,' the insurer enjoys,
and is burdened with, the contractual duty to assume control of the defense of
the suit against the policyholder. Control entitles the insurer to select and direct
defense counsel. Control entitles the insurer to determine defense strategy,
including whether to compromise the claim by settlement or to litigate the
claim to judgment. Control by the insurer is so pervasive that for claims that
are likely to be resolved within the policy limits of the insurance contract the
policyholder is often treated as a mere bystander to resolution of the underlying
claim.
2
The insurer's defense duties are defined by a body of law that imposes
significant obligations on the insurer in control of the policyholder's defense.
The insurer's obligations to the policyholder, insofar as control of the defense
is concerned, are often characterized by courts as fiduciary in nature.3 The
insurer that accepts the tender and enters into the defense of the policyholder is
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I The duty to defend attaches when the claim stated against the policyholder is one which if
true would be covered by the policy. Jurisdictions vary as to whether this determination is
limited to the allegations in the claim or whether the determination may be influenced by
external factors. See James Fischer, Broadening the Insurer's Duty to Defend: How Gray v.
Zurich Insurance Co. Transformed Liability Insurance Into Litigation Insurance, 25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 141 (1991); ROBERT JERRY H, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § Ill (2d
ed. 1996). See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (discussing scope of duty to
defend).
2 See, e.g., Robertson v. Chen, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264, 267-68 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting that "it
is common practice for insurance counsel and an adjuster to handle the negotiation of insur-
ance-funded settlements without the superfluous involvement of a fully-protected insured").
This insurer-control may be facilitated by statute. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6103.5 (West 2001) and Cal. Rule of Professional Conduct, Rule 3-510(B) (both requiring
lawyer to communicate settlement offers to "clients" and defining clients to include a person
employing the lawyer who possesses the authority to accept an offer of settlement).
3 Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos., Inc., 727 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999):
The fiduciary relationship arising out of the insurance contract is based upon the trust and reli-
ance that the insured is required to place in the insurer as a result of the unequal bargain and the
insurer's retention of discretionary control over the decision to settle or litigate the claim.
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bound to the policyholder. If the claimant is successful and prevails against the
policyholder, the insurer, having controlled the defense, may not now contend
that the claim is nonmeritorious or that it is not covered by the insurance con-
tract. Having litigated and lost, or settled to avoid a loss or further expense, the
insurer now pays the claimant the sum determined, up to the indemnity limits
of the policy. I characterize this position as the "standard" relationship. It typi-
fies the great majority of insurer-policyholder relationships involving liability
insurance and claim dispute resolution.
There are three recurring situations, however, when a claim falls outside
the standard relationship. In the first situation, the insurer may breach its con-
tractual promise to provide a defense thereby forcing the policyholder to
assume its own defense. The usual judicial response in the insurer-breach case
is to treat the claim as if it were within the "standard" relationship. The insurer
is deemed bound by a result reached in its absence to the same extent as when
the insurer is present and in control of the defense. This resolution discourages
insurer rejection of the policyholder's tender of the defense because the insurer
retains the burdens of the defense without the benefits of control. This
approach is "fault" driven; it is the insurer's breach of its duty to defend that
binds it to a dispute resolution to which it was not a party.
The second situation arises when a conflict of interest exists between the
insurer and the policyholder, usually over whether the claim is covered under
the insurance contract. The presence of a conflict of interest may deprive the
insurer of its right to control the defense, but not its duty to provide a defense.
The distinction between "control" and "duty" is drawn because of the concern
that the "conflict" may cause the insurer to use its power to control the defense
to the prejudice of the policyholder, such as by causing the policyholder to lose
the contractual right of indemnification.4 In this situation, the insurer may be
required to pay for counsel who is selected and directed by the policyholder if
the insurer wishes to later contest its duty to provide indemnification for the
Id. at 1157-58. The reference is metaphorical. An insurer is not a fiduciary simply because
it, as an insurance company, has entered into a contractual relationship with a policyholder.
Szumigala v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 853 F.2d 274, 280 n.7 (5th Cir. 1988). No court has
held that an insurer is a fiduciary in the traditional and formal sense envisioned by Cardozo
in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) ("A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive .. "). Courts that have prescribed a "fiduciary" obligation most com-
monly refer to the duty as fiduciary in nature. Hassard, Bonnington, Roger & Huber v.
Home Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (stating that "the relationship
between a policyholder and an insurer has many of the elements of a fiduciary relationship,
but is not an actual fiduciary relationship"); Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 252
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that the insurer's obligations "have been characterized as akin
to fiduciary-type responsibilities"). As Cardozo also noted: "Metaphors in law are to be
narrowly watched, for starting out as devices to liberate thought, they often end by enslaving
it." Berkey v. 3d Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
4 This situation is described in Part IV of this paper. The usual fact pattern involves a claim
which, depending on how the facts are resolved, may be a covered claim for which indem-
nity exists or an excluded claim for which no indemnity exists.
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loss.5 This resolution of the "conflict" transfers control of the defense from the
insurer to the policyholder.
The presence of a conflict of interest between the insurer and the policy-
holder over coverage does not necessarily excuse the insurer from performing
its other defense-related contractual duties, most importantly, its "duty" to set-
tle.6 Bifurcation of defense and settlement responsibilities is not, however,
problem free. Settlement is closely linked to indemnification. If the insurer
must finance a settlement negotiated by the policyholder, the insurer gains little
by attempting to preserve a claim that it has no duty to indemnify the policy-
holder. This is particularly true when the policyholder will be unable to reim-
burse the insurer for the costs of the settlement if the claims are, in fact, not
covered.7 In addition, any divestment of the right to control the defense, on
which the insurer's duty to settle is based, is accomplished without the presence
of fault, contrary to the situation in the insurer-breach cases. The judicial
response to the conflict of interest problem - a conditional defense under a
reservation of rights - is supposed to protect both the insurer's right to contest
its indemnity obligations and the policyholder's right to a defense by the
8insurer. The problem, however, is that both goals cannot be accomplished
simultaneously when the claim settles. The duty to fund the settlement must be
allocated to either the insurer or the policyholder. The specific issue of alloca-
tion has not been addressed in the conditional defense cases involving a conflict
of interest in any rigorous or systematic fashion.
I A policyholder may claim the right to control the defense when the insurer is defending
conditionally in cases involving a conflict of interest between the insurer and the policy-
holder. The jurisdictions split as to the types of "conflicts" that will cause the conditionally
defending insurer to lose the right to control the policyholder's defense. See infra notes 90-
91 and accompanying text.
6 I use the word "duty" with caution because whether a duty to settle exists outside the
context of insurer control of the defense constitutes an open issue in most jurisdictions. The
standard liability insurance contract. does not contractually obligate the insurer to settle;
rather, the obligation has been judicially imposed. Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance
and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1136 (1954); Kent Syverud, The Duty
to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113 (1990).
7 See, e.g., Mowry v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 385 N.W.2d 171 (Wis. 1986):
Badger State could have protected both its interests and its insured's interests by settling under a
reservation of rights agreement, Mowry and the circuit court assert. The record reflects that
Badger State's counsel and its claims manager considered such an option, but ultimately decided
to pursue the bifurcation procedure. A reservation of rights agreement would result in a settle-
ment of the [victim's] claims, while preserving the insurer's right to litigate the coverage issue.
The insured benefits from this procedure because it is protected from excess judgment. Badger
State argues, however, that the reservation of rights procedure will rarely result in the insurer's
recouping the payments it made to the victim from the insured where coverage is found not to
exist under the policy, because the insured may be judgment-proof.
Id. at 182-83.
8 A conditionally defending insurer provides a defense under a reservation of rights or non-
waiver agreement that permits the insurer to contest coverage notwithstanding its control of
the defense. See Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Stanewich, 142 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 1998)
(noting that an insurer defending conditionally under a reservation of rights is not bound as
to coverage by a verdict entered against the policyholding in the underlying action, the
defense of which was controlled by the insurer). The conditional defense is discussed in Part
IV of this paper, notes 83-111 and accompanying text.
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The third situation involves a policyholder who has contractually retained
the right to defend itself against claims. The insurer promises to provide solely
indemnification for covered losses. This situation, once largely limited to spe-
cialized forms of liability insurance coverage, such as Directors and Officers
Insurance, is now increasingly being encountered in commercial general liabil-
ity (CGL) coverages. The representative case involves a large corporate entity
that essentially self insures its first layer of coverage through a captive or front-
ing arrangement and only seeks to insure its extraordinary or catastrophic
losses through excess insurance.
This paper explores the question of who should fund a settlement in the
differing contexts presented by the standard and non-standard cases. This
paper looks specifically at the similarities and dissimilarities between the stan-
dard case when the insurer unconditionally assumes the defense on behalf of its
policyholder and the non-standard forms in which insurer control of the defense
is conditional or non-existent. The position urged in this paper is that in all non-
breach situations the funding obligation should be the responsibility of the
party in actual control of the defense. The funding obligation is not, however,
absolute. A party funding a settlement is entitled to restitution when the other
party, be it insurer or policyholder, is determined to be responsible under the
insurance contract for the loss covered by the settlement. In this regard, reim-
bursing a party for settlement funds advanced should be allowed whenever the
underlying settlement was reasonable on the merits and non-collusive. The rea-
sonableness of a settlement should be determined without regard to the costs of
defense the settlement avoided.
II. THE STANDARD CASE: THE UNCONDITIONAL DEFENSE
In the typical case that initiates an insurer's duties under the standard lia-
bility insurance policy, a claim is brought against the policyholder. The policy-
holder requests a defense by the insurer, i.e., "tenders" the claim to the insurer.9
9 Many courts treat tender of the claim to the insurer as a condition to the triggering of the
duty to defend. See SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 603, 614 (Minn.
1995), amended by 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995) (finding that formal tender of defense of
claim to the insurer is condition precedent to recover the costs of defense); see also LaFarge
Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 389, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1995), overruled in part by
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grapevine Excavation, Inc., 241 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2001); East-
man v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 315, 319 (S.D. Ind. 1966); Celina Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Citizens Ins. Co., 349 N.W.2d 547, 551 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). Mere notice of the claim to
the insurer absent a tender is generally deemed insufficient to trigger the duty to defend. But
see Cincinnati Cos. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 701 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ill. 1998) (holding that "the
better rule is one which allows actual notice of a claim to trigger the insurer's duty to defend,
irrespective of the level of the insured's sophistication, except where the insured has know-
ingly foregone the insurer's assistance"). The court noted that actual notice of the claim
obligated the insurer to at least inquire whether the policyholder wished the insurer to pro-
vide a defense. Id. at 505. See also Employers Cas. Co. v. Mireles, 520 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975) (holding that notice to the insurer was sufficient); Towne Realty, Inc. v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 548 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Wis. 1996) (holding that tender occurs once the policy-
holder gives notice of the claim to the insurer; any uncertainty as to the policyholder's
motives must be resolved by the insurer). Constructive tender may also be recognized. See
White Mountain Cable Constr. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 631 A.2d 907, 910 (N.H. 1993)
(finding that notice by policyholder to the insurer of the claim constituted an implicit tender
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The legal effect of the tender is to confer upon the insurer authority to defend
the policyholder.' Upon acceptance of the tender, the insurer will conduct an
investigation of the claim, usually through its claims facility. The claim may
be resolved short of litigation. Many claims are resolved in this way without
the involvement of counsel or litigation. In a number of cases, however, the
claim cannot be resolved short of litigation. The claimant and the insurer may
be too far apart in their estimates of claim value. The claimant may have
already initiated litigation by filing and serving a complaint on the policyholder
for which a response is due. For these or other reasons the need to involve
defense counsel will arise. When that need does arise, it will be the insurer to
which the claim was tendered who will make the decision regarding selection
of counsel. Through counsel, the insurer will, on behalf of the policyholder,
defend the claim. Counsel, retained and directed by the insurer, will determine
litigation strategy. For example, should the complaint be answered or chal-
lenged by pretrial motion? Who should be deposed? Should the claimant be
examined by an Independent Medical Examiner? Should expert witnesses be
retained?1" Settlement discussions will be conducted by defense counsel and
when notice was coupled with the policyholder's statement of its belief that the insurer had
duty to defend).
io The duty to defend is essentially a contractual obligation that is found in standard liability
insurance policies. See, e.g., Stamford Wallpaper Co., Inc. v. TIG Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 75, 79
(2nd Cir. 1998) (noting that "[t]he nature of the insurer's duty to defend is purely contrac-
tual. There is no common law duty as to which courts are free to devise rules.") (quoting
Linemaster Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Corp., No. 910396325, 1995 WL 462270, at
*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 25, 1995)).
It is unclear whether the insurer may defend the claim absent a tender by the policy-
holder. See Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098 (Cal. 1978) (holding that the
insurer was bound by a default judgment entered against the policyholder because the insurer
never sought to have the default judgment set aside); Nasongkhla v. Gonzalez, 34 Cal. Rptr.
2d 379, 380-81 (Ct. App. 1994) (permitting liability insurer to intervene to move to set aside
default entered against policyholder because otherwise the insurer may have no other oppor-
tunity to litigate fault or damages issues if and when claimant seeks to garnish insurance
policy proceeds to satisfy default judgment entered against policyholder); cf. Chapman v.
Kamara, 702 A.2d 977, 987 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (noting that customary policy provi-
sion requiring the insurer to defend policyholder authorized an initial appearance by retained
defense counsel appointed by the insurer to represent the policyholder), rev'd 739 A.2d 387
(Md. 1999).
1 How much control the insurer should be allowed over defense counsel's duty to represent
the policyholder is a subject that is beyond the scope of this paper. See In re Rules of Prof'l
Conduct & Insurer Imposed Billing Rules & Procedures, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000) (holding
that insurer imposed requirements on retained defense counsel for policyholders regarding
billings and practices interfered with required independent professional judgment that
defense counsel, as lawyers, must provide to the policyholders, their clients); cf Dynamic
Concepts v. Truck Ins. Exch., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 888 (Ct. App. 1998) (questioning "the
wisdom and propriety of so-called 'outside counsel guidelines' by which insurers seek to
limit or restrict certain types of discovery, legal research ... by outside attorneys [the insur-
ers] retain to represent their [policyholders]"). An adversarial relationship between defense
counsel and the insurance companies that retained them is, however, unlikely to exist as a
stable relationship; reconciliation is the more likely resolution. See Seeking Common
Ground: Insurance Industry Works With DRI to Avert Crisis, Lawyers Weekly USA (May
29, 2000) (discussing agreement between the insurance industry and the Defense Research
Institute over "Case Handling Guidelines" to be used by defense counsel retained by insurers
to represent policyholders).
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the claims adjuster from the insurer. Many courts require the attendance of the
claims adjuster or someone from the insurer with authority to compromise the
claim at mandatory settlement conferences.
The policyholder's participation in the defense may not be required or
even desired. There may be suggestions that the claim is friendly or collusive.
In some cases the existence of a preexisting relationship between the claimant
and the policyholder may result in the policyholder preferring to be uninvolved
in the resolution of the claim. Disassociation may help to immunize the policy-
holder from any dissatisfaction the claimant realizes as a result of litigation
since the policyholder can blame the insurer for the problems.
If the case settles, the settlement will be paid by the insurer. If the case
goes to trial, any adverse judgment will be paid by the insurer. In these cases,
it is assumed that the results are within the policy limits established by the
insurance contract.
Why does the insurer, a non-party to the dispute between the claimant and
the policyholder, engage in and perform the above duties? The initial response
is that the language of the insurance policy so requires, but why would the
insurer place the obligation in the standard form insurance contract in the first
place? The consequence is that the insurer, having effective control over the
defense of the claim, is deemed bound by the adjudication, even though it is not
a party to the action.' 2 Control of the defense places the insurer in "privity"
with the policyholder, the party of record, and binds the insurer to the result. 1 3
Why does the insurer contractually agree to defend the policyholder?
Why not simply promise to indemnify the policyholder against litigation losses
and leave control of the defense to the policyholder?14 The costs of defense are
12 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979):
These interests [protect resources of litigants, conserve judicial resources, foster reliance on judi-
cial decisions] are similarly implicated when nonparties assume control over litigation in which
they have a direct financial or proprietary interest and then seek to redetermine issues previously
resolved .... [T]he person for whose benefit and at whose direction a cause of action is litigated
cannot be said to be "strangers to the cause" ... [Olne who prosecutes or defends a suit in the
name of another to establish and protect his own rights, or who assists in the prosecution or
defense of an action in aid of some interest of his own... is as much bound.., as he would be if
he had been a party to the record.
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 39 (1982) (discussing when a party is deemed
to be in privity due to control of the litigation). Liability insurers in control of the defense
are commonly found to be in privity with their policyholders. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v.
Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. Ltd., 750 F.2d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 1984).
11 This is, in fact, the normal procedure in excess insurance policies. Indeed, a significant
difference between excess insurance policies and primary insurance policies is that the latter
contain first dollar exposure, invariably coupled with a duty to defend the policyholder.
Although the excess insurer usually need not provide or participate in the defense of the
policyholder, Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Zurich Re (U.K.) Ltd., 178 F.3d 883, 885-86 (7th Cir.
1999), a few exceptions have been recognized by some courts. The excess insurer may be
obligated to assume the defense of the policyholder: (1) when an underlying layer of indem-
nity coverage has been exhausted, see, e.g., Elas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 352
N.E.2d 60, 62-63 (Iil. Ct. App. 1976), although this result is aberrational; (2) when the
excess policy contains an express promise to defend, see, e.g., Hocker & Cummins v. N.H.
Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 1476, 1481-82 (10th Cir. 1991); or (3) when the excess policy is excess to
a self-insured retention, see, e.g., Cooper Labs., Inc. v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 802 F.2d
667, 675 (3d Cir. 1986) (again, another decision that is aberrational). Courts have held that
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large and are usually not included within the policy limits. Under standard
form liability insurance policies, the duty to defend is deemed a supplementary
obligation the cost of which is not accrued against policy limits. 5 Thus, if a
policyholder has policy limits of $100,000 per claim, the fact that the insurer
may expend $50,000 defending the claim before the claim is settled for
$100,000, does not reduce the insurer's indemnity obligation. In other words,
absent specific policy language to the contrary, the incurred defense costs do
not erode or reduce the policy limits available to pay the claim either by way of
settlement or judgment satisfaction.16 Similarly, the fact that the insurer
believes that the claim has a value of $10,000 may still require the insurer to
incur a $50,000 defense unless the insurer can reach a settlement with the
claimant. Including a promise to defend in the liability insurance policy
appears on the surface to carry no benefit for the insurer. The insurer simply
assumes greater costs (defense expenditures) with no upside or positive gain for
its efforts.
To see the matter that way would, however, cause us to lose sight of both
the benefits of providing a defense and the consequences of not doing so.
Insurers are sophisticated parties who have extensive involvement in the civil
justice system. Insurers are better situated than the average policyholder to (1)
evaluate claims objectively, (2) settle claims effectively, and (3) enjoy the ben-
efits of cost reduction that can be accomplished through volume purchasing of
litigation-related services, primarily attorneys' fees.' 7
the excess insurer's duty to defend may be triggered by a claim which invades the excess
limits when the excess policy obligates the insurer to defend the policyholder. See, e.g.,
Celina Mut. Ins. Co. v. Citizens Ins. Co., 349 N.W.2d 547, 550-51 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
The excess insurer's duty to defend, if any, is determined differently, however, from
that of primary insurers. A primary insurer's duty to defend is an express promise of the
insurer. The excess insurer's duty to defend arises by operation of contractual provisions,
such as "following form" or "ultimate net loss" that do not expressly promise a defense,
although the judicial construction of the provision may require the excess insurer to provide
a defense. See infra note 103.
11 See Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 748, 751 (Alaska 1996).
This approach may be modified by contract through the creation of an "eroding" or "burning
limits" policy. See, e.g., Lipton v. Lawyers' Mut. Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 344 (Ct.
App. 1996) (noting that the "policies also had a 'burning limits' provision whereby the pay-
ment of defense costs would reduce the available limits for each claim after exhaustion of a
$50,000 claim expense allowance"). Other terms for this type of provision include "eroding
limits," "self consuming policy," or "defense within limits." See generally Shaun McPar-
Land Baldwin, Legal and Ethical Considerations For "Defense Within Limits" Policies, 61
DEF. COUNS. J. 89 (1994).
16 See Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 927 P.2d at 751; Helfand v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pa., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 824 (1993); cf
Planet Ins. Co. v. Mead Reins. Corp., 789 F.2d 668, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that
inclusion of defense costs within ultimate net loss provision of policy did not create a
"defense within limits" policy).
"7 Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculation On the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'v REv. 95, 103-04 (1974) (suggesting that experienced litigants, having
greater resources, will on average outperform poorer, less sophisticated litigants); cf Earle v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 935 F. Supp. 1076, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding prejudice
arising out of late notice when late notice would impose on the insurer an obligation to
reimburse independent counsel at an hourly rate higher than the rate the insurer pays attor-
neys retained by it in the ordinary course of business). Repeat, experienced litigants may
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The standard liability insurance policy also permits the insurer to settle the
claim against the policyholder as the insurer "deems expedient." This power to
settle allows the insurer to extricate itself from its duty to defend as long as the
settlement is for the insurer's account. Thus, the insurer may pay, for its own
account, a premium over claim value to avoid a larger defense expenditure that
would be incurred in the absence of the settlement. This may be the case even
when the insurer settles within the deductible and, therefore, the cost of the
settlement is actually borne by the policyholder.18  Moreover, because the
insurer is settling the claim with its own money, it can take its defense costs
into account.19
Adding to the benefits the insurer derives from controlling the defense are
the consequences to the insurer of not controlling the defense. A policyholder
in control of the defense may lack strong incentives to defend all claims that
can be resolved within the indemnity policy limits provided by the insurer.
This is particularly true when we look at the policyholder's incentives in terms
of "first dollars." The policyholder can cap its losses at its deductible if it
offers the policy limits to the claimant immediately. The incentives to do this
may be great. A rational policyholder may consider settlement preferable to
even a remote possibility of personal liability when the cost of the settlement is
borne by another - the insurer. The simplicity of the example would, of
course, be distorted in the real world by concerns over strategic bargaining and
other considerations. For example, the policyholder may have "reputational"
interests that would cause her to reject reasonable settlement proposals because
settlement may be perceived as an admission of culpability. Alternatively, the
policyholder and the claimant may be linked in such a way (family, business,
social, etc.) that the policyholder would be moved by sympathy and self-inter-
est to purchase settlement early in order to end, or forestall, litigation or
delayed payment of the claim.2° The average policyholder probably would not
be as interested in conserving the policy dollars of the insurer as the policy-
also be less susceptible to the bias against "high risks of low probability" that may induce
less experienced defendants to settle claims above the claims' expected value.
18 See, e.g., United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Bartolotta's Fireworks Co., Inc., 546 N.W.2d 198,
201-02 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the risk that the insurer would "exploit" the policy-
holder in this situation was limited; that the acquisition by the insurer of the discretionary
right to settle was part of the bargain between the parties; and that the discretionary power
conferred on the insurer did not violate public policy); see generally Jon Epstein, Annota-
tion, Liability of Insurer To Insured For Settling Third-Party Claim Within Policy Limits
Resulting in Detriment to Insured, 18 A.L.R.5th 474, 487-88 (1994) (noting that the major-
ity of jurisdictions do not permit a policyholder to escape the obligation to reimburse the
insurer for deductibles after the insurer has settled a claim against the policyholder). Some
courts have imposed a "good faith" obligation in this context; however, the decisions are few
and difficult to reconcile. See infra note 21.
19 Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 837 (3d Cir. 1995):
[T]he language of FEB & K's policy with Vigilant expressly authorizes Vigilant to settle suits as
Vigilant deems appropriate. This grant of discretion to Vigilant permits it, in its evaluation of a
settlement, to consider factors such as the likelihood of defendants being found liable, the cost to
Vigilant of defense of the suit, the impression which various parties and witnesses may make at
the trial, the strength of the evidence, and the nuisance value of the claim.
20 William Barker, Insurer Control of Settlement: Basis and Limitations 8-9 (1996) (unpub-
lished paper on file with author) (noting that "insureds may be motivated to overpay by
considerations extrinsic to the legal obligation insured against: contrition for their involve-
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holder would be interested in conserving its own dollars. 2 ' Thus, the policy-
holder would prefer no settlement (i.e., continued litigation) only when the
policyholder's perceived costs of settlement (i.e., reputational injury, loss of
face, failure to provide money for injury to family or friends, etc.) outweighed
the perceived costs of continued litigation (i.e., value of time costs and emo-
tional stress of litigation). The end result would be to raise the average settle-
ment value of cases. If the increase in settlement costs was greater than the
costs of defense, insurers would be economically better off including a promise
to defend in their liability insurance contracts and factoring the costs of defense
into their premium rates.
There are no studies that I am aware of that attempt to quantify the costs
and benefits of control over non-control. That is really not surprising. Much of
daily life and practice seems to be driven by anecdotal information and intui-
tion. In conditions of uncertainty, coupled with the sound, intuitive belief that
policyholders would be freer with their insurers' monies than insurers would be
with their own money, risk aversion may induce insurers to avoid the risk of
policyholder generosity by exercising control over claims litigation.
Another fact also operates to encourage insurers to provide a defense;
even if insurers only provided pure indemnity liability insurance, courts might
bind them to the settlements engineered by their free-spending policyholders.
Could this happen? It happened in the past as I described in a previous arti-
cle.2 ' That development was driven by the exigencies of automobile liability
ment in the injury, desire to compensate an injured friend or relative, or the hope of promot-
ing some other relationship with the claimant").
21 In general, insurers may effect "within policy limits" settlements without factoring into
the decision the effect of settlement on the policyholder's reputational interest. As between
the policyholder and the insurer, the policyholder's interest in avoiding reputation stigma is
consistently subordinated to the insurer's financial interest when the insurer is in control of
the defense. See, e.g., Caplan, 68 F.3d at 837-38 (noting that policyholder's concern over
harm to reputation would not support "bad faith" action against the insurer for settlement
within policy limits of claim against policyholder); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Color Con-
verting Indus. Co., 45 F.3d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating majority view is liability
insurer does not have duty to handle the claim in a manner that would protect the policy-
holder from losing its best customer); W. Polymer Tech., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 38 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 78 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding insurer could settle the claim without the consent of the
policyholder even though the settlement allegedly injured the policyholder's reputation).
22 See supra note 1. The reason for this rule is also explained in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 57 (1980) (stating that when an indemnitor who has no contractual duty to
defend is given reasonable notice of an action within the scope of the indemnity and an
opportunity to assume or participate in the defense, a judgment for the claimant against the
indemnitee may be binding on the indemnitor if the indemnitee defended the action with due
diligence and reasonable prudence). The reason for this rule is the conservation of judicial
resources. Id. at cmt. a. When the indemnitor refuses, for reasons other than conflict of
interest, to assume or participate in the defense, and the indemnitee defaults, "the indemnitor
is estopped to deny the existence and extent of the indemnitee's liability to the injured
party"; however, "the indemnitor is free to litigate all the issues that must be determined in
establishing his obligation to indemnify . I..." d. at cmt. b. Cf Horn Constr. Co. v. MT
Sec. Serv. Corp., 468 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416 (App. Div. 1983) (holding that indemnitor that
resisted inclusion in action brought against indemnitee was bound by a reasonable, good
faith settlement of that action by the indemnitee).
Spring/Summer 2002]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
litigation and the brooding omnipresence of Financial Responsibility Laws.23
While that aggregation of facts cannot be duplicated across the range of liabil-
ity insurance contexts, it was perhaps enough to resolve the issue for insurers,
at least at the working, first layer coverage limits. 24 The use of pure indemnity
liability insurance at the working layer of coverage may have been perceived as
a risk too great to run given the precedent established in the automobile liability
cases. In any event, the promise to defend proved popular and the costs of
providing that coverage are ultimately borne by the policyholder through the
premiums charged.2 As long as the costs of defense can be adequately quanti-
fied by good underwriting, it is reasonable for insurers to provide the additional
defense coverage. Indeed, it is only with the recent significant rise in defense
costs that this perspective has been subject to reconsideration through the crea-
tion of "eroding limits" policies. In the end, insurers generally find it is in their
economic interest to control the defense of the claim rather than relinquish it to
the policyholder. That is why "control" is the hallmark of the standard case
and why insurers include a promise to defend in standard liability insurance
policies.
If the insurer provides the defense, what consequences does this have on
the insurer's indemnity obligations when settlement efforts fail and the claim
results in a judgment against the policyholder? In this posture, the claimant/
23 This is an area where the desire to compensate victims through an insurance mechanism
has received express judicial acknowledgment and approval. See, e.g., State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Ragatz, 571 N.W.2d 155, 159 (N.D. 1997) (stating the Financial Solvency
Legislation creates a strong incentive to construe automobile liability policies to provide
compensation for victims of policyholder negligence in connection with the operation of
motor vehicles); Jeffreys v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 767, 769 (N.C. Ct. App.
1997) (stating that the primary purpose of Financial Solvency Legislation is to provide com-
pensation to victims of accidents).
24 We should not ignore the impact of automobile accident litigation in the development of
liability insurance law. The sheer volume of automobile accident cases, estimated to consti-
tute approximately one third of filed civil cases, makes them the "army ants" of the civil
justice ecosystem. Roger Hanson et al., What is the Role of State Doctrine in Understanding
Tort Litigation?, 1 MICH. L. & POL'y REV. 43, 57-58 (1996) (stating that automobile acci-
dent cases constitute thirty-five percent of general civil filings (tort, contract, and property)
in fault jurisdictions and twenty-three percent of the filings in non-fault jurisdictions); JAMES
KAKALIK & NICHOLAS PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 131-32
(Rand Corp. Inst. for Civil Justice ed. 1986) (automobile accident cases constituted fifty-
five percent of civil jury verdicts in state courts and sixteen percent of civil jury verdicts in
federal courts). This latter figure is significant given that only about two percent of filed
civil cases go to jury trial. Samuel Gross & Kent Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of
Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases For Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 393
(1991).
25 Insurers often provide expanded coverage when the market demands it. Insurers, like all
other producers, must respond to market demands if they wish to sell their product. See,
e.g., Michael Bradford & Judy Greenwald, Reinsurers Show Their Primary Colors: Insurers
Wary as Soft Market Leads Reinsurers to Compete For Some Business, Bus. INS., Nov. 10,
1997, at 26. Michael Bradford, 10 Largest U.S.-Based Insurance Wholesalers: Crump
Insurance Services Inc., Bus. INS., Sept. 15, 1997, at 49 (noting that providing new products
and programs was the reason Crump was able to increase premium volume in soft insurance
market). Susanne Sclafane, Take "Notice" of D&O Policy Language, NAT'L UNDERWRITER
PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Sept. 15, 1997, at 22 (noting that in soft
commercial insurance market insurers are providing broader notice provisions more
favorable to policyholders in order to secure business).
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judgment creditor can now garnish the insurance policy as an asset of the poli-
cyholder.26 In a typical garnishment action, the garnishee can litigate whether
there is a "debt." In the context of liability insurance, the "debt" is the cover-
age obligations of the insurance contract. 27 Even a short perusal of the stan-
dard liability insurance policy will indicate that the standard form insurance
contract does not promise coverage for any and all claims. Some claims fail to
come within the coverage initially promised; for example, the loss may not
"occur" within the policy period,28 may not involve a person insured under the
26 Most jurisdictions have "no action" statutes or enforce "no action" clauses that preclude
an action by a claimant until the policyholder's liability has been legally determined. See
JERRY, supra note 1, § 84[b] (noting that the general rule in the United States is that claimant
does not possess a direct right of action against the insurer).
27 Cf Nat'l Mem'l Servs. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 49 A.2d 382 (Pa. 1946):
After a loss has occurred, the right of the insured or his successor in interest to the indemnity
provided in the policy becomes a fixed and vested right; it is an obligation or debt due from the
insurer to the insured, subject only to such claims, demands, or defenses as the insurer would
have been entitled to make against the original insured.
Id. at 383 (citation omitted). The decision involved the insurer's unsuccessful attempt to
enforce a non-assignment of rights provision in the insurance contract. When garnishment is
sought under a direct action statute, supra note 26, the claimant's interest in the policy is
often said to have vested at the moment of injury. See Cushing v. Md. Cas., 198 F.2d 536,
539 (5th Cir. 1952), vacated on other grounds, 347 U.S. 409 (1954); see also Morewitz v.
W. of England Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Assoc. (Luxembourg), 62 F.3d 1356,
1362-63 (11 th Cir. 1995) (noting that under Alabama statute injured claimant could maintain
direct action against insurer for policy benefits). That interest may, however, be affected by
post-loss actions by the policyholder and the insurer. Compare Reagor v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
415 N.E.2d 512, 516 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (stating that a post-loss agreement between the
policyholder and the insurer that the loss is not covered, entered into before the policyholder
is determined to be liable to the claimant, is not binding on the claimant). The court noted:
As a beneficiary of a liability insurance policy, an injured person has rights under the policy
which vest at the time of the occurrence giving rise to his injuries. Moreover, he is a real party in
interest to the liability insurance contract. The injured person must be given the opportunity to
litigate the question of coverage under the liability insurance policy before his interest in the
insurance may be terminated. Thus, where an insurer brings a declaratory judgment action to
determine coverage of a claim made against its insured, the injured person is a necessary party to
the suit, and the injured person may appeal from a judgment that there is no coverage.
Id. at 514 (citations omitted), with Estate of Shoff v. Estate of Zimmerman, 1998 WL
887227 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1998) (unpublished) (holding that settlement between
claimant and policyholder absolved the insurer of coverage obligations and noting that
"[w]hile an injured party has a 'substantial' right on the tortfeasor's policy from the time of
injury that right is not vested until a judgment against the tortfeasor is secured") (citation
omitted).
28 Standard general liability insurance provides coverage for bodily injury resulting from an
occurrence; occurrences are in turn defined as: "an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." Insurance Services
Office Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (1982, 1984), reprinted in ROBERT E.
KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES,
LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES, app. J(1), at 1157 (Student ed. 1988). The
overwhelming rule in the United States is that, for insurance coverage purposes, in the typi-
cal case an accident occurs not when the loss engendering act occurs but when the injury or
harm results from that loss engendering act. See, e.g., Schrillo Co. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 226 Cal. Rptr. 717, 720-21 (Ct. App. 1986). If the injury or harm that forms the
basis of the claim occurred after the policy period concluded, the claim would not be cov-
ered for indemnity purposes. See, e.g., BVMI v. Ind. Indemn. Co., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 557,
560-61 (Ct. App. 2001).
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policy,2 9 or may not fall within the coverage promised.3" Other claims, while
falling within the initial scope of coverage, may be subsequently excluded from
coverage.3 ' Can the insurer, which has accepted the tender and assumed con-
trol of the defense, contest the garnishment action by asserting that the claim
for which judgment was entered is not a covered claim; therefore, there is no
"debt"? The usual answer is that the insurer, which controls the defense, can-
not contest coverage.
The reason the answer is usually "no" is frequently misunderstood.
Unlike the situation with regard to the merits of the underlying claim, the bar to
contesting whether the claim is covered under the insurance policy is not purely
a consequence of "privity." The insurer's inability to contest coverage is a
legal consequence that arises from a combination of several related factors: (1)
the insurer's decision to accept the tender; (2) the insurer's assumption of the
defense of the policyholder; and (3) the insurer's control over the conduct of
the defense to the claim on behalf of, and to the exclusion of, the policyholder.
"Privity" arising out of the control of the defense bars the insurer from litigat-
ing the existence and extent of the policyholder's liability to the claimant that
was resolved in the underlying litigation brought by the claimant. "Privity"
arising out of control of the defense does not, by itself, however bar the insurer
from litigating the issue of coverage.
In some cases, litigation of facts relevant to coverage may be barred under
principles of privity and collateral estoppel.32 This occurs when factual issues
relating to the underlying claim are also dispositive of the coverage issue. For
example, the underlying claim may be for assault and battery and the insurance
policy may have an Assault and Battery or Intentional/Expected Act exclusion.
In this context, the facts relating to the merits of the claim overlap with those
pertinent to the issue of coverage of that claim. Because collateral estoppel
bars relitigation of facts, not theories of recovery or causes of action, the reso-
lution of the merits of the claim may bar relitigation of facts pertinent to the
coverage of the claim. This application of collateral estoppel would not, how-
ever, pick up cases when there was no overlap, as when the coverage defense is
based on whether the policy was valid or in effect or whether the defendant was
an insured. For example, the insurer may contend that the insurance policy is
29 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 982 S.W.2d 151, 155
(Tex. App. 1998) (holding that insurer did not breach duty to defend a party (tenant) who
was not a named insured under the insurance contract between the insurer and the landlord
of the tenant).
30 Keppler v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1999) (holding that liability
coverage based on "use" of a vehicle was not met in situation when dog bit child while both
were in the policyholder's parked vehicle).
31 Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 966 P.2d 1099, 1107 (Haw. Ct. App.
1998) (applying "business pursuits" exclusion in homeowner's liability insurance policy to
claim against policyholder for sexual harassment); Cook v. Evanson, 920 P.2d 1223, 1226
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that pollution exclusion barred coverage for claim of injury
resulting from policyholder's negligence that allowed fumes to escape).
32 When coverage facts overlap liability facts the insurer's control of the defense collaterally
estops it from relitigating the adjudicated facts. See, e.g., Preferred Am. Ins. v. Dulceak, 706
N.E.2d 529, 533 (111. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that insurer which controlled defense of its
policyholder could not relitigate policyholder's negligence in subsequent uninsured motorist
arbitration); see also infra note 39.
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avoided by reason of the policyholder's misrepresentations in the insurance
application or the policyholder's failure to satisfy conditions to coverage, such
as the duty to give timely notice and/or cooperate in the defense of the suit.
The insurer may contend that the party claiming coverage does not fall within
the definition of who is an insured under the insurance contract. It is unlikely
that the facts of these coverage defenses would be litigated in the resolution of
the merits of the underlying claim. Even if there is some factual overlap at the
margin, barring litigation of those "facts" in the coverage action may be per-
ceived as unfair.
33
The insurer is foreclosed from contesting its obligations by its "uncondi-
tional" acceptance of the tender. "Unconditional acceptance" bars the insurer
from later taking the inconsistent position that the claim is not covered. The
basis for this rule is said to lie in "waiver," "estoppel," or "election." In fact, it
is difficult to make an exact fit between any of the above if one uses the formal
definition of the concept as a guide.34 There is, nonetheless, a consistent theme
in the cases that it would simply be inequitable to permit the insurer to exercise
the benefits of controlling the defense while avoiding the consequences of that
exercise. 35 The argument is, however, usually not advanced in judicial deci-
sions beyond the bare assertion that fairness demands that the insurer uncondi-
tionally performing its defense obligation not be allowed to contest its
indemnity obligation.
The counter-argument that the unconditionally defending insurer should
be allowed to contest coverage, rests largely on the perception that the policy-
holder is not factually aggrieved by allowing the insurer to contest coverage
when coverage facts are different from liability facts. Under this view, the poli-
cyholder has not sustained harm or injury resulting from the insurer's providing
a defense; rather, the policyholder has simply received a contract benefit, the
promised defense. The promise to defend is, however, a distinct and different
contract benefit from the promise to indemnify. Allowing the insurer to contest
indemnity coverage neither adds to nor detracts from the "rights" secured to the
policyholder under the insurance contract. Performance of one contractual
obligation (defense) should not be seen as requiring the performance of all
33 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTs § 28(5)(b) (1982) (stating that preclusive
effect to a prior determination will not be given when "it was not sufficiently foreseeable at
the time of the initial action that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action").
3 ROBERT KEETON & ALAN WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.1(b) (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that
doctrines of waiver and estoppel have been used instrumentally by courts to justify coverage
decisions those courts believed were fair, just, and reasonable under the circumstances). The
most popular theory is equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Filos, 673
N.E.2d 1099, 1104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (noting that when the insurer unconditionally defends
the policyholder, the insurer is estopped to contend that the non-covered claim is outside the
scope of the coverage promised by the policy); see also Transamerica v. IBC, 94 F.3d 1204,
1207-08 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); Safeway Managing Gen. Agency v. Cooper, 952 S.W.2d
861, 867-68 (Tex. App. 1997) (noting exception to "no estoppel into coverage" rule when
the insurer assumes the unconditional defense of the policyholder).
31 See, e.g., Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 932, 939 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Nationwide, 673 N.E.2d at 1104. There are some contrary decisions, but they consti-
tute a distinct minority view. Essex Ins. Co. v. Stage 2, Inc., 14 F.3d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir.
1994) (refusing to bar the insurer on equitable estoppel grounds from denying coverage after
accepting tender unconditionally).
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other contractual obligations, particularly when, as here, the obligations are dis-
tinct and triggered by different factual arrays.3 6
It may also be asserted that the policyholder's loss of control over the
defense supports the bar to the insurer contesting indemnity coverage. This
position ignores, however, that the reason the policyholder lost control was that
it requested the insurer to assume control. Having voluntarily surrendered con-
trol to the insurer, the policyholder is hardly in an advantageous position to
claim that it "lost" something. The insurer's position that acceptance of the
defense should not prejudice its right to contest indemnity coverage is
enhanced, moreover, by the recognition that the defense obligation is broader
than the indemnity obligation in that the insurer may have to provide a defense
because of the possibility of coverage, but not provide an indemnity because in
actuality the claim is not covered. In effect, the "loss of control" argument
bootstraps the insurer; the obligation to defend subsumes the obligation to
indemnify.
Estopping the unconditionally defending insurer from contesting coverage
has also been sustained on fairness justifications related to disclosure. When
the policyholder tenders the defense to the insurer, courts have imposed the
requirement that the insurer disclose the terms under which it will "accept" the
tender.37 As originally formulated, this requirement rested on a formal, "either-
or" view of rights created by the insurance contract. Either the policyholder
was contractually entitled to an unconditional defense or she was not; there was
no middle ground the insurer could occupy under the insurance contract. The
policyholder could put the insurer to an election between an unconditional
defense and a rejection of the tender. A conditional defense required some
form of assent on the part of the policyholder, although assent was often
implied.3" While this "forced election" approach has been largely discarded in
favor of giving the insurer the power to defend conditionally or uncondition-
ally,3 9 the "assent" approach was consistent with the disclosure justification for
36 The duty to defend is usually triggered by the "possibility" that an asserted claim against
the policyholder is covered by the insurance contract. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Inc. v. State,
665 P.2d 648, 653 (Haw. 1983). The duty to indemnify is, however, determined by adjudi-
cated facts, not allegations. Moreover, while the insurer need only indemnify those claims
found to be within coverage, the insurer must defend the entire suit even if only a portion of
the suit raises a possibly covered claim. Ellen Pryor, The Tort Liability Regime and the Duty
to Defend, 58 MD. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1999) (noting the general rule that "if only one of the
claims contained in the lawsuit triggers the duty to defend, the insurer must provide a
defense with respect to the entire claim because, in general, it is not possible to defend only
the potentially covered claim") (footnotes omitted).
37 Kirschner v. Process Design Assoc., 592 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Mich. 1999) (stating that
"when an insurance company undertakes the defense of its insured, it has a duty to give
reasonable notice to the insured that it is proceeding under a reservation of rights, or the
insurance company will be estopped from denying its liability"); cf. Bluestein & Sander v.
Chicago Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying New York law, holding that
prejudice to insured may be presumed when insured loses control of the defense to uncondi-
tionally-defending insurer).
38 Gossard v. Ohio Cas. Group of Ins. Cos., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190, 191 (Ct. App. 1994)(noting that the policyholder's silence to the insurer's notice of providing a conditional
defense will be deemed "acquiescence").
" See infra note 89 and accompanying text. The policyholder may reject the conditional
defense and assume control of the defense; however, such a course of conduct is usually
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estopping the unconditionally defending insurer. If the insurer could withhold
disclosing whether it would contest coverage, (in other words, conditionally
defend), the policyholder's right to force the insurer to obtain the policy-
holder's "assent" to a conditional defense would be lost. Recognition of the
policyholder's right to force the insurer (1) to elect to defend unconditionally,
(2) to reject the tender, or (3) to secure the policyholder's consent to a condi-
tional defense imposed a correlative duty of disclosure on the insurer, i.e., the
insurer must declare its position at the outset, not play cat and mouse with the
policyholder. Although the movement away from recognizing a right in the
policyholder to force the insurer to elect between an unconditional defense or
rejection of the tender undermines the estoppel theory, the estoppel argument is
deeply ingrained in insurance law and remains the dominant position.4 °
deemed to be for the policyholder's account. See Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145
(Haw. 1998):
[Tihe right to refuse an insurer's tender of a defense under a reservation of rights is man-
dated by the HRPC. See HRPC Rule 1.8(f), stating that "[a] lawyer shall not accept compensa-
tion for representing a client from one other than the client unless: (1) the client consents after
consultation[.]" The requirement of client consent necessarily implies the right not to consent.
Therefore, if the client does not desire the representation under the terms offered by the insurer,
the insurer must either choose to defend unqualifiedly or allow the insured to conduct its own
defense of the action.
If the insured chooses to conduct its own defense, the insured is responsible for all attor-
neys' fees related thereto. The insurer is still potentially liable for indemnification for a judg-
ment within the scope of insurance coverage. However, having refused the contractual terms of
the policy, the insured foregoes its right to compensation for defense fees. A contrary holding
would effectively nullify our determination that the insurer, even in a reservation of rights situa-
tion, retains the contractual right to select the counsel whom it will pay to defend the insured.
Id. at 1155.
4 Approximately forty-two states recognize and apply estoppel theory to bar an uncondi-
tionally defending insurer from contesting indemnity coverage, although some of these juris-
dictions also rely on the related concept of waiver. See Robert Heist, The Tripartite
Relationship and the Insured's [sic] Duty to Defend Contrasted With Its Desire to Manage
and Control Litigation Through the Introduction of the Legal Audit, Appendix State Survey
on Duty to Defend, 602 PL/LIT 221, 249-362 (April 1999).
The full extent of the insurer's estoppel is unclear. The issue is presented most force-
fully when the judgment involves covered and uncovered claims. Some courts have permit-
ted an allocation, but have placed the burden of making the allocation on the insurer.
Guidance as to how such an allocation would be made has been lacking. Some decisional
law has arisen in the context of policy limits. In Buckley v. Orem, 730 P.2d 1037 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1986), the insurer sought a declaration of its liability on an unallocated verdict against
its policyholder when it appeared that the liability of its policyholder might exceed the pol-
icy's $100,000 per person limits as to one of the claimants. If the insurer was successful it
could limit its responsibility by capping its indemnity obligation at $100,000 as to that
claimant. Any excess or difference between the $100,000 and the amount of the total verdict
allocated to that claimant would be bome by the policyholder. The court held that the
insurer could allocate under these circumstances if it could "[produce] evidence showing a
substantial likelihood of overpayment should the unallocated verdict be paid." Id. at 1042
(collecting cases and describing its approach as the majority rule); see Magnum Foods, Inc.
v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 1498 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that insurer which under-
takes control of the defense has the duty "not to prejudice the insured's rights by failing to
request special interrogatories or a special verdict in order to clarify coverage of damages");
but cf Villicana v. Evanston Ins. Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 699 (Ct. App. 1994), ordered not
published per Rules 976, 977, California Rules of Court (Jan. 19, 1995) (stating that
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This is a weak doctrinal justification for preventing the unconditionally
defending insurer from contesting indemnity coverage. The bar rests funda-
mentally on the perception that the insurer ought to affirmatively disclose to the
policyholder concerns the insurer has that would support a no-coverage posi-
tion regarding indemnity. The assertion of these concerns by the insurer would,
however, constitute a conditional defense, a position inconsistent with that
actually taken by the insurer. There is much circuitry to the argument; nonethe-
less, the basic concern that the insurer disclose its intended position resonates
well with courts.4 Thus, it is not surprising that the unconditionally defending
insurer is deemed bound by its position notwithstanding the doctrinal shortcom-
ings of the rule. The practical consequence of the privity and estoppel doc-
trines is that the unconditionally defending insurer will usually have no defense
in a garnishment action.
The legal consequences of taking the claim to judgment directly influences
the insurer's decision to settle short of judgment. The insurer will be bound to
pay any judgment up to policy limits; therefore, the insurer has an incentive to
settle whenever its anticipated defense costs (which are not subject to policy
limits) and its indemnity obligation regarding the expected judgment (which are
subject to policy limits) are greater than a settlement it can now strike with the
claimant. There are, of course, other factors, such as the respective risk aver-
sion of the claimant (and his attorney), relationships between the parties (for
example, is the policyholder a valued customer of the insurer), blandishments
by the settlement judge (some judges create settings which facilitate settlement;
other judges are not as effective), attitudes of the parties (either the claimant or
his attorney or the insurer may prefer litigation over settlement because they
wish to send a message to the other side or see the case as establishing a
favorable precedent). While these sundry factors may be present in an individ-
ual case, the factors appear sporadically in the cases. The insurer must, how-
ever, in every case balance its actual and immediate "out of pocket" costs of an
early termination of the case through settlement with the claimant against the
expected "actual costs" of non-termination of the case, i.e., continued defense
costs and an adverse award having a determinable present, expected value. Lia-
bility insurers quantify these costs and assess the cost-benefit relationship
between immediate settlement and continued defense.
If the claim settles, the insurer will pay the settlement, again assuming it
is within policy limits, and even in some cases when the settlement exceeds
policy limits, to prevent the case from transmuting into a case having a "bad
faith" exposure."2 The insurer's post-tender decision-making regarding settle-
insurer's use of "special interrogatories" while in control of defense would be evidence of
"bad faith"), modified by 29 Cal. App. 4th 489b (1994).
41 See Kirschner, 592 N.W.2d at 709 (noting that when an insurer undertakes the defense of
its insured, the insurer has a duty to give reasonable notice to the insured that it is providing
a conditional defense or the insurer will be estopped from contesting indemnity coverage);
see infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (suggesting pragmatic reasons for requiring
disclosure by the insurer of its coverage position).
42 The insurer's discretionary right to settle must be distinguished from its implied duty to
settle. An insurer breaches its duty to the policyholder if (1) the insurer has assumed control
of the defense of its policyholder under a liability insurance policy, (2) there is both a risk of
an excess judgment and an opportunity to settle, and (3) the insurer fails to settle a claim that
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ment of the claim is not a product of specific contractual language. Settlement
decision-making by the insurer is posterior to the treatment of the case as
within or outside the standard relationship. By the time the insurer has reached
the position where it can settle the claim, it has already acted in a way that will
cause the claim to be treated as standard or non-standard. The decision to
defend conditionally or unconditionally is usually made when the claim is first
tendered to the insurer.4 3 Having elected to defend unconditionally, the insurer
must now make settlement decisions given the legal consequences imposed by
having assumed an unconditional defense.
The rational, unconditionally defending insurer's willingness to pay is a
function of the consequences of a failure to settle arrayed against a settlement
that will conclude further litigation and determine the insurer's financial expo-
sure for the claim. The calculation is driven by the reality that the insurer will
be bound by a judgment entered against the policyholder. If the insurer could
litigate, without penalty, its coverage obligations after having given its uncon-
ditional assent to the tender, this would likely affect settlement rates, although
in which direction and to what extent is difficult to say. The claimant, or the
policyholder, would have to compensate the insurer for surrendering its right to
contest coverage. This would reduce the costs of settlements for insurers. On
the other hand, the claimant would be less interested in accepting a discount of
its claim against the policyholder absent assurance that the settlement would be
paid in a timely fashion. This expectation would tend to reduce the number of
settlements.
The standard relationship's key features then are that the insurer has (1)
unconditionally accepted the tender and (2) assumed control of the defense.
These two features drive the legal doctrines that tie the insurer to judgments
entered against the policyholder and bar insurers from interposing coverage
defenses in garnishment actions to satisfy the judgment against the policy-
holder. These legal "facts of life" influence unconditionally defending insurers
to fund settlements in those situations when settlement is preferable to further
litigation.
A claim does not come pre-marked as within the standard relationship
between policyholder and insurer. That characterization is a consequence of
is within the policy limits without lawful cause. See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d
173, 177-78 (Cal. 1967). Today, almost all jurisdictions recognize extracontractual remedies
for this type of settlement practice. See Stephen Ashley, BAD FArTH ACTIONS, App. II
(1984) (summarizing bad faith law in each state). See generally Syverud, supra note 6, at
1120 n.14 (noting that forty-seven states allow insureds to sue for the failure to settle).
Payment of the excess policy limits verdict by the insurer may not preclude a "bad faith"
action when the insurer unreasonably rejected a within-limits settlement offer. See, e.g.,
Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos., Inc., 787 A.2d 376, 379 (Pa. 2001); Critz v. Farmer's Ins.
Group, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405 (Ct. App. 1964); but see Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Cope, 462
So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1985) (contra).
43 The insurer may be allowed to change its initial position. Moving from a conditional to an
unconditional defense does not present a problem. The same cannot be said for the move-
ment from an unconditional to a conditional defense. To justify the change the insurer must
be able to point to some fact or event that it was not aware of and reasonably could not have
been aware of when it accepted the tender unconditionally. Moreover, the insurer must
demonstrate that it did not use its control of the defense to discover the facts or events on
which its conditional defense is based.
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how the insurer responds to the tender. If the insurer accepts the tender uncon-
ditionally and controls the defense, the claim is within the standard case. It can
be expected that the more obvious it is that a claim is within coverage and can
be resolved within policy limits, the more likely it is that the insurer will
respond to the tender unconditionally. On the other hand, the less likely it is, as
perceived by the insurer, that the claim is covered or can be resolved within
policy limits, the more likely it is that the insurer will respond to the tender in a
manner that causes the claim to be identified as non-standard. Much of the
tension in the decisional law is represented by instrumental doctrine that
imposes economic sanctions on insurers to induce insurers to treat claims, as to
which they have legitimate coverage doubts, as within the standard case. This
is the inevitable consequence of a rule that seeks to discourage insurers from
using rejection for strategic purposes vis-A-vis policyholders or claimants. A
rule is necessarily objective in approach and thus over-inclusive when directed
at a problem that is, at root, subjective. If the expected cost resulting from
treating the claim as non-standard is greater than the expected cost resulting
from treating the claim as standard, the insurer will be induced to accept the
tender unconditionally. The different expectations reflect the fact that the
insurer's view of the coverage dispute may not be shared by the court or jury.
The chance that the court or jury will disagree with the insurer or treat the
insurer's coverage position as unreasonable is another legal "fact of life" the
insurer must factor into its decision whether to accept or reject the tender.
III. THE NON-STANDARD CASE: INSURER BREACH OF
THE DUTY TO DEFEND
Courts frequently state that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to
indemnify.' This means the insurer will frequently be required to defend the
policyholder in a lawsuit even though it is uncertain, and occasionally even
unlikely, that upon resolution of the litigation, the insurer will be required to
cover the judgment, i.e., provide indemnity coverage. Moreover, absent appro-
priate policy language the insurer cannot "buy" its way out of an expensive
defense by depositing the policy limits in court, interpleading its policy limits,
or paying the policy limits directly to the claimant, unless that payment con-
cludes the litigation between the claimant and the policyholder.45 A defense
11 First Bank of Turley v. Fid. & Deposit Ins. Co. of Md., 928 P.2d 298, 303 n.10 (Okla.
1996) (collecting decisions).
45 The standard requirement is that only payments of judgments and settlements are counted
against policy limits. Gross v. Lloyds of London Ins. Co., 358 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Wis. 1984)
(holding that tender of policy limits without securing release of policyholder is not an actual
settlement and is therefore ineffectual in exhausting policy limits and extinguishing insurer's
duty to defend); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Sullivan, 597 N.E.2d 62, 64 (Mass. Ct.
App. 1992) (same, but distinguishing case involving multiple claims and valid policy limits
settlement and release with less than all claimants); compare Simmons v. Farmers Ins.
Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (enforcing provision allowing insurer to
terminate defense on payment of policy limits); Am. States Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Arnold, 930
S.W.2d 196, 200-01 n. 1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1996) (collecting cases). An insurer which settles a
claim without securing a complete release of its policyholder may incur "bad faith" expo-
sure. Strauss v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811, 813 (Ct. App. 1994); see also
Fama v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 646 N.Y.S.2d 930, 933 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
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paid for by the insurer has obvious economic value for the policyholder and for
the claimant. An insurer, which knows that its policy limits will be exhausted
by a claim but still cannot escape continuing to pay for a defense, has an incen-
tive to contribute some of its anticipated defense costs to a settlement that will
excuse the insurers continued participation in the claim.46
The duty to defend arises out of a promise made by the insurer. To a
much greater extent than the promise to indemnify, to which a third party may
claim some interest, the duty to defend is owed solely to the policyholder,47
even while, as noted previously, the duty to defend may have economic value
to the claimant. While insurers would no doubt prefer that courts view the
promise to defend more narrowly as solely derivative of the promise to indem-
nify, courts have taken a much broader perspective and have identified the
promise to defend as a separate, independent form of coverage, in effect,
"defense" or "litigation" insurance.48 Thus, an insurer may breach its duty to
defend even if it is later determined that no indemnity coverage in fact exists, if
the jurisdiction's rules nonetheless obligate the insurer to provide a defense.
For example, a jurisdiction, which obligates an insurer to provide a defense
whenever the tendered claim is "potentially covered" under the insurance pol-
icy's indemnity coverage, does not excuse that duty because it is subsequently
determined that no coverage in fact existed. The duty to defend is excused
under this test only if the insurer establishes there is no potential that the claim
is covered.4 9
The insurer's duty to defend is activated by the tender of a claim within
coverage. It is irrelevant whether the claim is meritorious or groundless:5 ° the
focus is on coverage. The test is simple: if the claim were true, would it be
46 This may create incentives for risk-seeking claimants who may attempt to collect a por-
tion of the defense costs from the insurer by way of settlement. See Chris Guthrie, Framing
Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000) (contending
that risk-seeking plaintiffs will consistently best risk-adverse defendants because these plain-
tiffs have psychological leverage, which they will rationally exploit to induce defendants to
settle at amounts above the claim's true expected value).
17 Only the policyholder can claim a breach of the duty to defend. Jane Doe v. Ordinary
Mut., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131, 135 (Ct. App. 1995) (noting that a third-party claimant may not
bring an action against the insurer for breach of the duty to defend absent an assignment of
that right from the policyholder). This means, however, that it is the policyholder's claims
that may be asserted, not the claimant's. See Maynard v. Sauseda, 329 N.W.2d 774, 780
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting breach of duty to defend claim that was assigned to the
claimant by the policyholder when the claimant sought recovery based on his attorney's fees
expended rather than the policyholder's), vacated and on remand 130 Mich. App. 445
(1983); Quam v. Wulfekuhle, 390 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that the
insurer's defense of the policyholder creates a coverage estoppel argument that is available
only to the policyholder, not the claimant).
48 Pryor, supra note 36, at 4; Fischer, supra note 1, at 145.
49 See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1993).
10 See Reese v. Travelers Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
extrinsic factual evidence cannot excuse the insurer's duty to defend when a covered claim is
specifically pled even though: (1) the extrinsic evidence shows the claim is excluded from
coverage; and (2) the extrinsic evidence shows the claim is groundless). The extrinsic fac-
tual evidence involved the "owned property" exclusion and evidence that contamination had
not actually occurred to property of another notwithstanding a contrary allegation. Id. at
1060.
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within coverage? If the answer is "yes," the insurer must provide a defense.
The allegations are broadly construed in support of the contention that the
claim is covered.51 Coverage possibility is determined based upon the facts as
they appear or are known to the insurer at the time of the tender. In other
words, the insurer cannot reject a tender and then engage in an after the fact
effort to backdate a justification for the rejection.52 In this regard, the insurer's
ability to reject a tender or discontinue a defense may be restricted even to the
extent the insurer may use the product of its coverage investigation to escape its
defense obligation. For example, when a claim within coverage is pled, the fact
that the insurer accurately determines through an investigation that the claim is
meritless may not excuse the duty to provide a defense.53 Even the claimant's
stated intent not to assert a claim within coverage may not relieve a insurer of
its duty to defend.54
51 Roman Catholic Diocese of Springfield, I11. v. Md. Cas. Co., 139 F.3d 561, 565 (7th Cir.
1998) (noting that all doubts as to coverage, insofar as the duty to defend is concerned, are
resolved against the insurer).
52 Haskel, Inc. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 520 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that it is the
duty of the insurer to undertake the defense unless it can confine the claim to a recovery the
policy does not cover). After accepting the tender the insurer may learn that the claim is not
covered. In that situation the insurer may bring a declaratory relief action to secure a deci-
sion that it has no duty to defend and it may rely on post tender developed evidence, subject
to certain limitations. See, e.g., Parsons v. Cont'l Nat'l Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94 (Ariz.
1976) (holding that the insurer could not base a coverage denial on evidence obtained by a
lawyer the insurer selected to represent the policyholder in the underlying litigation). Until
the insurer secures a non-coverage decision in the declaratory relief action, it must continue
to provide a defense. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metzler, 586 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992) (noting that if the insurer decides it has no duty to defend, it must protect its interest
by filing a declarative relief action or conditionally defend; the insurer refuses to defend at
its peril).
The converse is not the rule. Knowledge may bring a claim within the duty to defend.
Am. States Ins. Co. v. Natchez Steam Laundry, 131 F.3d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting
that under Mississippi law, duty to defend attaches even when no claim within coverage is
asserted when insurer has actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of facts that
would trigger coverage and the duty to defend).
53 Reese v. Travelers Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that when
claimant alleged damage to property other than the policyholder's, insurer's investigation
which determined that injury was limited to policyholder's own property, and thus within
"owned property exclusion" in the insurance policy, did not relieve insurer of its defense
obligation triggered by the pleaded claim). While Reese states the rule, the approach has
been criticized. See Pryor, supra note 36, at 16-18 (criticizing approach that decouples cov-
erage exclusions from determination whether a claim is covered on the ground that the
approach may not reflect the bargain rational parties would strike if they expressly consid-
ered the matter). If the duty to defend is based upon an ambiguity in the claim, the insurer's
ability to clarify the ambiguity and demonstrate that, as clarified, there is no basis for impos-
ing a duty to defend the claim may excuse the insurer from a duty to defend.
5' Dobrin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 897 F. Supp. 442, 444 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that "[a]
mere statement by the complainant that he does not intend to make [a covered claim] is
insufficient to establish as a matter of law that such a claim does not exist"). The court also
noted that "[a]s a matter of policy ... the insurer cannot avoid coverage simply because the
complainant seeks a tactical advantage in the lawsuit." Id. This position is, however, of
uncertain validity. The "potentiality" test is usually seen as referring to the potentiality that
the claim is subject to indemnity coverage, not the potentiality that a claim potentially within
coverage will be asserted. See, e.g., Hurley Constr. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 12
Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "the insured may not speculate about
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The insurer's decision whether to accept or reject the tender is also influ-
enced by the consequences of an erroneous decision, i.e., a breach of its prom-
ise to defend. In this regard, insurers will often find that the consequences of
an erroneous refusal to defend, whether characterized as a breach of contract or
as tortious, are quite severe. The insurer must compensate the policyholder for
out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the policyholder when the policyholder
assumed the defense after the insurer breached." Although the policyholder's
defense costs are subject to a reasonableness constraint, the policyholder is not
limited to the amounts the insurer pays when it retains defense counsel for a
policyholder.5 6 It should quickly be observed that this result is likely to be
much worse for the insurer than any costs that would probably have been
incurred by the insurer in control of the defense. The policyholder is unlikely
to have access to the discounted rates insurers obtain because of the volume,
regularity, and nature of work they provide insurance defense firms. 57 Conse-
quently, the costs of the defense for the policyholder are likely much higher
than an equivalent defense paid for by the insurer.58 The policyholder's liabil-
ity is not capped by policy limits; thus, the policyholder may approach the
defense of the case differently from the insurer. For example, the insurer acting
in good faith may fund the defense at the lower end of the range of reasonable-
ness; the policyholder may fund, or authorize funding, the defense at the upper
end of the range of reasonableness. The policyholder need only incur a liability
for defense costs, including attorney's fees, to create a claim for economic
unpled third-party claims to manufacture coverage"). There is a gray area between imper-
missible speculation and reasonable interpretation of a pled claim to determine if it contains
a claim potentially within the indemnity coverage promised. See infra 86-87 and accompa-
nying text.
15 Because the insurer has contractually promised a defense, the policyholder's damages are
measured by what was lost. In this case the courts do not apply the so called "American
Rule" that each side is responsible for its own costs of suit insofar as the underlying litiga-
tion is concerned. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257
(1975). The "American Rule" does apply to the subsequent coverage litigation, but in this
context the rule has been relaxed in many jurisdictions. See Eugene R. Anderson & Joshua
Gold, Recoverability of Corporate Counsel Fees in Insurance Coverage Disputes, 20 AM. J.
TRIAL ADvoc. 1, 3-5 (1996).
56 Amato v. Mercury Cas. Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 913 (Ct. App. 1997) (stating that when
the policyholder provides a defense after the insurer wrongfully declines to do so, the usual
measure of damages is the cost of the defense).
57 The routine nature of much personal injury litigation means that the firm can be highly
leveraged. Paralegals and recent law school graduates can do much of the work at a cost to
the firm substantially less than the discounted rates. Moreover, insurers are increasingly
bringing defense work in house which enables them to keep a close eye on counsel costs.
The propriety of these actions has begun to receive serious scrutiny. David May, Note,
Inhouse Defenders of Insureds: Some Ethical Considerations, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 881
(1998). A recent article in the ABA Journal noted the increased use of in-house staff by
insurance companies to provide a defense for policyholders. Debra Baker, A Grab for the
Ball, 85 A.B.A.J. 42 (April 1999) (discussing several court challenges to the use of in-house
staff as retained defense counsel).
58 In this context, reasonable fees are usually determined by the market rate available to the
policyholder, which may be greater than the actual rate paid by the policyholder. See JAMES
FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 333(b) (1999) (noting split in authorities whether
either the incurred cost of employing lawyers or the retainer agreement operate to limit the
amount of recoverable fees).
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damages against the insurer. Indeed, the stronger the claim of breach by the
insurer, the greater the economic incentives of the policyholder and the attorney
to provide an "expensive" defense and seek recoupment from the insurer.
The calculation of cost of defense damages does not present anything
unique or extraordinary to this area of law. The awarding of additional dam-
ages is, however, another matter. It is here that many courts have adopted a
damages approach that strongly deters insurers from declining tenders in all but
the most clear cut, no coverage case.
When the insurer breaches the duty to defend by erroneously declining the
tender of the defense, many jurisdictions prevent the insurer from relitigating
issues resolved in the underlying litigation, such as the policyholder's liability
and the claimant's damages. 59 This occurs even though, as a result of its rejec-
tion of the tender of the defense, the insurer has not controlled the defense of
the claim; rather, the policyholder has controlled the defense. The primary jus-
tification for this approach is to remove any economic incentives that would
encourage the insurer to reject the tender.
The breaching insurer, while not completely at the mercy of the policy-
holder and the claimant, is greatly restricted in any efforts to avoid a result
reached in its absence. The insurer may relitigate those issues only if it can
show that the underlying resolution was "unreasonable" or was a product of
"fraud or collusion" between the policyholder and the claimant.6 ° The underly-
ing rationale for barring relitigation of claim liability is that the "breach" of the
duty to defend serves as a surrogate for the "privity" that is created when the
insurer unconditionally defends.
Second, not only is the breaching insurer precluded from relitigating the
merits of the underlying claim, the insurer may be barred from litigating
whether the claim is covered. As noted by the Washington Supreme Court:6
59 JERRY, supra note 1, at § 111 [h][5] (noting split in the decisions as to whether the breach-
ing insurer is responsible for the policyholder's settlement of the underlying action, but con-
cluding that barring the insurer from contesting the merits or the value of the underlying
claim is the better approach). It should be observed that barring the insurer from contesting
coverage and barring the insurer from invoking policy limits are distinct and different issues
even though both are often found in the breach of defense cases. Id. at § I11 [h][6] (discuss-
ing whether breaching insurer should be barred from contesting that the settled claim is
covered).
60 Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Perry, 692 A.2d 1388, 1391-92 (Me. 1997):
The insured's right to indemnification for a settlement entered into following an insurer's wrong-
ful refusal to defend, however, is not without limitation. An insurer is liable only if the settle-
ment amount is reasonable and is made in good faith. Such a settlement reached by the insured
is presumptively reasonable, however, and the insurer has the burden of proving that the settle-
ment is unreasonable or in bad faith.
Id. at 1391 (citations omitted); see also Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Westerfield, 961 F. Supp. 1502,
1509-10 (D.N.M. 1997) (holding that under New Mexico law a finding that the underlying
settlement was preclusive does not excuse the insurer's indemnity obligations; the finding
does, however, strip the settlement of its preclusive effect against the insurer); Carlson v.
Zellaha, 482 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Neb. 1992). The relationship between unreasonableness and
collusion has proved difficult to resolve. Xebec Dev. Partners, Ltd. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 749-60 (Ct. App. 1993); Wolff v. Royal Ins. Co., 472 N.W.2d
233, 236 (S.D. 1991).
61 Kirk v. Mt. Airy Ins. Co., 951 P.2d 1124 (Wash. 1998).
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When the insurer breaches the duty to defend in bad faith, the insurer should be held
liable not only in contract for the cost of the defense, but also should be estopped
from asserting the claim is outside the scope of the contract and, accordingly, that
there is no coverage. The coverage by estoppel remedy creates a strong incentive for
the insurer to act in good faith, and protects the insured against the insurer's bad faith
conduct ....
Without coverage by estoppel and the corresponding potential liability, an
insurer would never choose to defend with a reservation of rights when a com-
plete failure to defend, even in bad faith, has no greater economic consequence
than if such refusal were in good faith. The requirement of acting in good faith
cannot be rendered meaningless.6 2
If the claim, as resolved by the policyholder, is covered, the insurer usu-
ally must pay the claim up to policy limits. In some jurisdictions, the breaching
insurer's liability is extracontractual and may exceed policy limits. 63 The rea-
son for barring litigation over the carrier's indemnity obligation is that the
breach of the duty to defend serves as a surrogate for the estoppel that arises
when the insurer unconditionally defends.'
The insurer which breaches its duty to defend thus sustains two significant
legal consequences from its actions. The first consequence is that the insurer
loses control of the defense to the policyholder. A corollary to this is that the
policyholder is freed of its contractual obligation to cooperate and assist the
62 Id. at 1128 (citation omitted).
63 Amato v. Mercury Cas. Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 913-14 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
when the insurer tortiously breaches duty to defend and as a consequence the policyholder
suffers an adverse judgment, the insurer is liable for the entire judgment even if the claim is
not covered under the policy); Conway v. Country Cas. Ins. Co., 442 N.E.2d 245, 249 (Iil.
1982) (same). Many jurisdictions, however, limit the insurer's liability. Under this
approach, if the insurer breaches the duty to defend by refusing to accept a valid tender, the
insurer assumes responsibility for the insured's litigation costs and is normally required to
indemnify the insured for a settlement of the underlying claim up to the policy limit. See
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 1976)
("[L]iability for failure to defend is ordinarily limited to the amount of the policy plus attor-
neys' fees and costs."); Engeldinger v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters, 236 N.W.2d 596,
601 (Minn. 1975) (re-affirming the rule that an insurer is liable up to only the "maximum
policy coverage" and is not liable for the entire verdict even in cases of bad faith). The
rationale appears to be that while the breaching insurer should not be in a better position than
the non-breaching insurer, see infra note 74 and accompanying text, neither should the
breaching insurer be in a worse position than the non-breaching insurer else the policyholder
would be better served by breach than performance. Cf. Mesmer v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund,
725 A.2d 1053, 1065 (Md. 1999) (holding that extracontractual damages are limited to "bad
faith" failure to settle claims against insurers that have assumed control of the defense;
because the insurer that wrongfully refuses to defend does not control the defense, no "bad
faith" claim for breach of duty to defend is possible).
61 Most jurisdictions rely on principles of estoppel to bind the breaching insurer to the
extracontractual damages, but some jurisdictions rely on principles of proximate cause.
Some courts permit relitigation even when the insurer breaches its duty to defend. See N.W.
Pump & Equip. Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1241 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting
arguments that insurer which breached duty to defend may not contest indemnity coverage);
Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd. v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd., 875 P.2d 894, 912-13 (Haw. 1994)
(holding that blanket application of coverage by waiver or estoppel, when insurer breaches
duty to defend, subverts any meaningful distinction between the duty to defend and the duty
to indemnify and serves no purpose other than to punish the insurer for breach of its contrac-
tual duty) (collecting decisions).
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insurer and not settle without the insurer's consent.65 The policyholder is given
substantial leeway to conduct the defense to extricate itself from the position it
finds itself in due to the insurer's breach. Principles of "good faith and fair
dealing" and "mitigation of damages" would suggest a general obligation to act
reasonably and prudently; however, courts have not attempted to equalize the
duties of the policyholder in control of the defense because of insurer-breach to
the duties of the insurer in control of the defense and because of unconditional
acceptance of the tender.66 To see this, one need only compare the significant
scrutiny that attaches to insurer settlement conduct with the corresponding lax
scrutiny of policyholder settlement conduct.67 Even adjusting so that we com-
pare situations when the insurer's settlement conduct is evaluated against a
backdrop of policyholder breach of contractual duty, one finds the insurer's
settlement conduct is strictly scrutinized, whereas policyholder settlement con-
duct receives perfunctory scrutiny.68
65 Maneikis v. St. Paul Ins. Co. of II1., 655 F.2d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
"insurer has no right to insist that the insured be bound by the provisions of the insurance
contract inuring to its benefit.... when it has already breached the contract by violating the
provisions inuring to the benefit of the insured"); Sims v. Ill. Nat'l Cas. Co., 193 N.E.2d 123,
129 (I11. App. Ct. 1963), quoted in Eigner v. Worthington, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808, 813 (Ct.
App. 1997) (noting that "[w]hen an insurer wrongfully refuses to defend, the insured is
relieved of [the] obligation to allow the insurer to manage the litigation and may proceed in
whatever manner is deemed appropriate") (citations omitted).
66 See McNicholes v. Subotnik, 12 F.3d 105 (8th Cir. 1993):
We turn next to St. Paul's contention that the settlement agreement is the product of fraud and
collusion because Subotnik received several side benefits from the agreement and because the
amount agreed upon was not reasonable and prudent. St. Paul's argument confuses the issue of
fraud and collusion with the separate issue of reasonable and prudent settlement. The settlement
agreement is not the product of fraud and collusion simply because St. Paul believes that the
amount agreed upon is not reasonable and prudent.
Id. at 109.
67 Most jurisdictions have rejected attempts by insurers to impose affirmative obligations of
good faith and fair dealing on policyholders. See, e.g., First Bank of Turley v. Fid. &
Deposit Ins. Co. of Md., 928 P.2d 298, 307-08 (Okla. 1996) (holding that liability insurer has
no cause of action for reverse bad faith by policyholder); Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., 533 N.W.2d 203, 207-08 (Iowa 1995) (same). More importantly, some courts have
expressly permitted the policyholder to consider its own interests when evaluating settlement
offers from the claimant. See, e.g., Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 610 P.2d 1038 (Cal. 1980) (refusing to excuse excess insurer's duty to indemnify when
policyholder rejected settlement offer which would have limited recovery to lower layers of
coverage). Compare Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. N. Star Reinsurance Corp., 153 Cal. Rptr. 678
(Ct. App. 1979) (holding that policyholder, which colluded with primary insurer to allocate
losses so as to reduce primary's exposure while increasing excess insurer's exposure,
breached duty owed to excess insurer). Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and Safeway Stores
suggest that when the policyholder is in control of the defense, the policyholder cannot seek
to increase the insurer's obligations and decrease its own obligations by falsifying the
record; however, the policyholder can be a risk taker in a way the insurer cannot when the
insurer is in control of the defense.
68 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (noting that a settlement by the policy-
holder after the insurer has breached its duty to defend is deemed presumptively reasonable).
The courts do tend, however, to recognize a duty on the part of the policyholder to conduct
itself after the insurer's breach in a manner that would mitigate damages. See, e.g., Rhone-
Poulenc Basic Chem. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196-98 (Del. 1992)
(holding that mitigation provision in insurance contract clearly and unambiguously imposed
a duty to mitigate on policyholders to prevent further environmental contamination, but not
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The second consequence for the insurer which breaches its duty to defend
is that it is bound by the resolution secured by the policyholder in control of the
defense as if the insurer were in control. Considerations that could have been
legitimately ignored by the insurer in its settlement decision-making may sig-
nificantly influence the policyholder toward settling the claim at the high range
of reasonableness or beyond.69
The strategic interests of the claimant and the policyholder may change so
that rather than acting as adversaries, each may find it in its own interest to
quantify the loss and attempt to shift responsibility to the insurer. Thus, the
claimant and policyholder may agree to compromise the dispute. In exchange
for policyholder concessions regarding the value of the claim, the claimant may
agree to look primarily or exclusively to the insurer for satisfaction of the
claim.7 ° This resolution can be achieved in a number of ways, the most com-
mon being a settlement, stipulated judgment, a default judgment, or a "no
defense" trial.7" In each of these cases, the claimant will agree not to seek
to repair or restore damage that had already occurred, and that the required mitigation costs
were not covered expenses under the policy). The court stated in dicta, however, that a
similar result would be reached even in the absence of an express mitigation requirement:
Public policy clearly favors imposing upon insureds a duty to mitigate damages. In the absence
of such a rule, insureds could sit back and allow environmental damage to accumulate until they
are compelled to mitigate damages through litigation. The provision at issue here is consistent
with that policy.
Id. at 1197; see also Real Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. Lloyds of London, 61 F.3d 1223, 1229-30
(5th Cir. 1995) (stating that under Louisiana law a plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages
and the duty is not excused by the insurer's breach of the duty to defend); Boeing Co. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 516 (Wash. 1990); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. San Mateo
County Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, 635 (Ct. App. 1989); but see Heller v. The
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 833 F.2d 1253, 1258 (7th Cir. 1987)
(refusing to impose, in the absence of a clear, unequivocal, and specific contractual require-
ment, that the policyholder submit to surgery to attempt to minimize his disability).
69 The policyholder's reputation interest, which the insurer may disregard, see supra note
15, in effecting settlement decisions may loom large when the policyholder is in control of
the defense. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (noting that rational policyholder
may be less protective of insurer's interests than insurer would be).
70 Even if the policyholder must mitigate its losses, supra note 68, mitigation does not
necessarily require that the policyholder maintain an aggressive defense. The policyholder
need only do what is reasonable given the resources available. See supra note 60. The fact
that a different course of conduct would, with the benefit of hindsight, have been more
effective is not determinative. See Amato v. Mercury Cas. Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 913-14
(Ct. App. 1997).
71 This approach, while commonplace, is not without risk to the parties to the "agreement."
Steil v. Fla. Physician's Ins. Reciprocal, 448 So. 2d 589, 592 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984) (stating
that settlement figure is more suspect when policyholder receives covenant not to execute
and thus bears no financial liability for settlement). There is less insistence in "breach" cases
that the policyholder obtain an adjudication of liability from a third-party neutral, such as a
court or jury, than in cases when the insurer has not rejected its defense obligation but is
presented with a compromise engineered by the claimant and the policyholder. See State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714-15 (Tex. 1996):
[W]e hold that a defendant's assignment of his claims against his insurer to a plaintiff is invalid
if (1) it is made prior to an adjudication of plaintiff's claim against defendant in a fully adver-
sarial trial, (2) defendant's insurer has tendered a defense, and (3) either (a) defendant's insurer
has accepted coverage, or (b) defendant's insurer has made a good faith effort to adjudicate
coverage issues prior to the adjudication of plaintiff's claim. We do not address whether an
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enforcement of the award against the policyholder, but look solely to the
insurer for satisfaction. Because the posture of the case is that the insurer
breached, courts frequently limit insurer attacks on these forms of dispute reso-
lution to a showing that the resolution achieved between the claimant and the
policyholder was unreasonable, collusive, or fraudulent.7 2
The consequences of breaching the duty to defend are so severe and the
tests for triggering the duty to defend are so broad, that the insurer assumes
substantial risks when it declines a tender because of its belief that the claim is
not covered. The decisional law strongly encourages insurers to assume the
defense of their policyholders even in cases in which the policyholder's right to
a defense is marginal at best. 73
It may be contended that it is unfair to hold even a breaching insurer to a
result reached in its absence. Moreover, in the litigation the insurer is "repre-
sented" by a party, the policyholder, who in the aftermath of the declination of
the defense may no longer share common litigation interests with the insurer.
In the "no breach" cases, insurer's unconditional acceptance and control of the
defense are the central premise of the arguments that bind the insurer to the
results reached and prevent it from raising coverage defenses. The absence of
acceptance and control would seem, at the minimum, to permit the insurer to
litigate the issue of coverage. The decisional law is, however, generally to the
contrary.
Courts have barred the breaching insurer from litigating issues involving
either the underlying claim or coverage not only to encourage insurers to accept
tenders, but also under the rationale that a breaching insurer should not be in a
better position than an insurer that accepts the tender.74 The benefits derived
from controlling the defense are immediate and the risks associated with rejec-
tion of the tender of the defense are great. In jurisdictions creating an estoppel
out of "breach," a cautious insurer would reject a tender only when the deci-
sional law has established that the claim is not covered.7" If insurers could
assignment is also invalid if one or more of these elements is lacking. In no event, however, is a
judgment for plaintiff against defendant, rendered without a fully adversarial trial, binding on
defendant's insurer or admissible as evidence of damages in an action against defendant's insurer
by plaintiff as defendant's assignee.
72 See supra note 60.
73 Fischer, supra note 1 (suggesting that the approach was deliberate, not accidental). Deci-
sions, such as Kirk, discussed at notes 61-62 and accompanying text, support the "encour-
agement" theory.
74 Geddes & Smith v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 334 P.2d 881, 883 (Cal. 1959).
Approximately twenty-six states recognize estoppel theory as barring the insurer which
breaches its duty to defend from contesting indemnity coverage. See supra note 40.
75 Professor Abraham explored why the insurer would breach the duty to defend under the
assumption that the liability costs for nonperformance in doubtful cases are greater than
performance costs in doubtful cases. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSUR-
ANCE LEGAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 195-96 (1986). Professor Abraham noted that
breach was often caused by uncertainty:
Nevertheless, the duty to defend sometimes is breached. As in the case of settlement of suits
against the insured, however, the reason generally is not subjective bad faith, but contractually
unregulated discretion. The problem is that policies provide for a duty to defend whenever a
judgment against the insured in the suit in question would be payable under the policy. But if at
the outset of a suit against the insured the ultimate coverage responsibility of the insurer under
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decline tenders and preserve the ability to litigate coverage, we would likely
see an increase in such conduct.7 6 When insurers are barred from litigating
coverage issues if they erroneously reject the tender, this sanction will serve as
an incentive for insurers to accept tenders in marginal cases.77 The duty to
defend cases have been marked by a consistent judicial theme of encouraging
insurers to accept tenders and provide defenses for their policyholders. Courts
have manifested a preference that coverage issues be litigated, if at all, separate
from the defense of the claim and, most importantly, that the policyholder not
be forced to bear the costs of defense while awaiting a judicial declaration
whether a defense is owed. Rather, it is the insurer, encouraged by draconian
sanctions for erroneous rejections, who must bear the costs of defense until
judicially relieved of the obligation or until the insurer can resolve the claim in
a manner that permits it to terminate properly its defense obligation to the
policyholder.7 8
The insurer-breach case exhibits several features that should serve to limit
it as a model for non-breach cases.79 First, in the breach case the policyholder
has lost what it specifically contracted for, a defense paid for by the insurer.
Second, the policyholder has lost the benefit of the insurer's experience and
the policy is uncertain, then it is also unclear whether the duty to defend has been triggered. The
language of the standard liability policy provides almost no guidance.
Id. at 196 (footnote omitted).
76 Kirk v. Mt. Airy Ins. Co., 951 P.2d 1124 (Wash. 1998).
77 The insurer can, of course, litigate whether there was a duty to defend. Often this inquiry
includes a coverage determination. However, the burden of proof is different in the defense
context from the indemnity context. For purposes of the duty to defend it is sufficient for the
policyholder to show that the claim as pleaded is within, or potentially within, the coverage
promised by the policy. For purposes of indemnification, the policyholder must show that in
fact as adjudicated the claim is within coverage. Whether a duty to defend exists is deter-
mined based on facts actually and constructively known by the insurer. To avoid a defense
obligation the insurer may have to show that no duty to defend exists as a matter of law.
Haskel, Inc. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 520, 527 (Ct. App. 1995). The ability of an
insurer to obtain a declaratory coverage determination is discussed by Pryor, supra note 36,
at 21-48.
78 The duty to defend may be terminated by payment of policy limits in settlement of claims
or judgments against the policyholder, Am. States Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Arnold, 930 S.W.2d
196, 203 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996), by declaratory relief demonstrating that, as a matter of law,
there is no potential for liability, Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153,
1160 (Cal. 1993), or by amendment of the suit by the claimant, eliminating all claims on
which a duty to defend may be based. See Reser v. State Farm, 981 S.W.2d 260, 263-64
(Tex. Civ. App. 1998). These examples are not exhaustive of the methods by which the duty
to defend may be terminated, nor are they without exception. Cf Nationwide Ins. Co. v.
Hunley, 915 F.2d 557, 558 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that it is unresolved under California
law whether payment of policy limits on behalf of named insured excuses insurer from duty
to defend additional insured).
79 A policyholder may wrongfully obtain control of the right to settle. Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 43, 45-48 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that settlement
entered into between policyholder and claimant was not enforceable against insurer which
had assumed control of the defense and had not consented to settlement). What constitutes
the "wrongful" assumption of the right to settle varies. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Morris,
741 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1987) (permitting policyholder to enter into reasonable settlement with
the claimant when the conditionally defending insurer unreasonably rejects a "within limits"
settlement offer and thus exposes the policyholder to personal liability in excess of policy
limits).
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expertise as a repeat player within the civil justice system.8" Lastly, there is the
difficulty in measuring the full consequences of the breach. Was the loss
"caused by" the breach or by the conduct of the defense by the policyholder?
Should the policyholder's conduct of the defense be held to the same standard
as the insurer's conduct of the defense would have been if the insurer had not
breached but defended? Would the result have been different if the insurer had
conducted the defense? Generally, courts have given only slight attention to
these issues; they have tended instead to focus on the fact of insurer breach as
disqualifying the insurer from complaining too loudly, or too much, about
developments subsequent to the breach. Doubts are resolved against the insurer
because the insurer is the party in breach and the insurer's breach created the
uncertainty.8 '
It is important to place this problem within the context of the values the
duty to defend has come to symbolize for policyholders and the benefits that
the legal system accrues when insurers, with their financial resources, become
involved in the dispute resolution process. 82 Settling claims and compensating
claimants are recurring themes in dispute resolution and insurance law. We
should not be surprised that the synergistic force of the two concepts would
help drive a doctrine that discourages insurer rejection of tenders and, corre-
spondingly, encourages insurer participation in the defense of the claim.
IV. THE NON-STANDARD CASE: CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE
INSURER AND THE POLICYHOLDER
In the standard case, the insurer makes an unconditional acceptance of the
tender of the defense and thereby binds itself to the fortunes of the policy-
holder. Insurers are strongly encouraged by draconian legal sanctions to accept
tenders in all but the clearest cases of non-coverage. The insurer's duty to
defend is based on the claim as alleged. The insurer's duty to indemnify the
policyholder is based on the claim as adjudicated or resolved. 83 As a conse-
80 See supra note 17.
81 This is analogous to the rule in damages quantification that a defendant who has caused a
loss will not be heard to complain about a plaintiffs incomplete damages proof when the
defendant has by its actions made it difficult for the plaintiff to substantiate its proof. Bige-
low v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946). The principle has early common law
roots. See Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722). In Amato v. Mercury Casualty
Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 917-18 (Ct. App. 1997), the court rejected the contention that the
policyholder must establish that the insurer's refusal to defend resulted in a larger award
against the policyholder than would have occurred if the insurer had not breached the duty to
defend.
82 See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1996) (noting that our legal system "prefers
settlements" and that we "have designed a system of civil justice that embodies and
expresses that preference in everything from the rules of procedure and evidence, to appel-
late opinions, to legal scholarship, to the daily work of our trial judges") (footnotes omitted).
83 Reser v. State Farm, 981 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1998):
[T]he duty to defend and the duty to indemnify are two "distinct and separate duties." Generally,
the factual allegations in the petition and the policy language trigger the duty to defend. This
duty is unaffected by facts ascertained before suit, developed in trial, or by the ultimate outcome
of the case. Unlike the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify only arises after an insured has
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quence of the broader duty to defend test, insurers accept tenders for the
defense of many claims as to which no duty to indemnify may exist.
If the universe of the insurer's potential responses to a tender was either to
accept unconditionally or decline, the insurer would be required to make a sig-
nificant coverage decision, having long-term implications, early in the dispute
resolution process before the insurer had the opportunity to conduct an investi-
gation of the facts. The insurer's promises are not, however, open-ended. The
promise of indemnification is conditioned on the claim being within the scope
of coverage promised. The duty to defend cannot be completely decoupled
from the duty to indemnify without rewriting the bargain entered into between
the policyholder and insurer. A promise to defend claims within coverage is
different from a promise to defend any claim. No standard form insurance
contract purports to promise to defend the policyholder against any claim.
If the insurer were presented with only an "either-or" choice, this might
call into greater question the propriety of imposing draconian sanctions on the
insurer which erroneously declined a tender.84 Thus, it is not surprising that a
middle ground has been created, nor is it surprising that courts have empha-
sized the existence of the middle ground alternative when affirming the use of
draconian sanctions against an insurer that erroneously declined a tender of the
defense and failed to take advantage of the middle ground option.
The middle ground that courts have recognized is the conditional defense.
A conditional defense exploits the differences between the legal tests that dis-
tinguish the insurer's duty to defend from its duty to indemnify. Under a con-
ditional defense, the insurer accepts the tender and agrees to provide a defense
for the policyholder, but the insurer reserves the right to contest that the insurer
has obligations to indemnify the policyholder.85 This may be accomplished
bilaterally through the acceptance by the policyholder of a "no waiver" agree-
ment. Alternatively, the insurer may impose the conditional defense unilater-
ally through a reservation of rights letter. The effect of each approach is to
permit the insurer to assume the defense of the claim against the policyholder
without waiving, surrendering, or losing the right to contend that the claim is
not subject to indemnity under the policy. For example, the claim may be that
been adjudicated, whether by judgment or settlement, to be legally responsible for damages in a
lawsuit.
(citations omitted).
84 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. In Liquor Liab. Joint Underwriting
Assoc. of Mass. v. Hermitage Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 964 (Mass. 1995), the insurer declined
the tender of an assault and battery claim based on an assault and battery exclusion. The
court held that the duty to defend nevertheless attached because the policyholder's liability
was alleged to also lie in its negligence in serving alcohol to the patron who committed the
assaults. The court rejected authorities that had held the exclusion was encompassing of
negligent failure to do something. Id. at 967-68. The consequence was that the insurer was
deemed liable for the entire settlement because it was unable to establish an allocation
between the damages based on the covered and the non-covered theories of recovery pro-
posed by the claimant. Id. at 968-69.
85 See, e.g., First Gen. Realty Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 981 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.
1998) (noting that insurer's offer of a conditional defense does not constitute a refusal to
defend). The insurer will be permitted a reasonable period of time to conduct an investiga-
tion and analyze the claim in order to make a coverage decision. Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v.
Truck Ins. Exch., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 889-90 (Ct. App. 1998).
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the policyholder battered the claimant. Battery may be excluded from coverage
under the policy, but the claim may be factually susceptible to a construction
and ultimate resolution as involving injury due to negligence, a covered claim
under standard liability coverage.86 As so construed, the insurer would have a
duty to defend.87 However, if the insurer accepted the tender unconditionally
and if the claim were sustained, the insurer might have to indemnify the policy-
holder for a claim the insurer intended to exclude from coverage. If the claim
resulted in a general verdict for the plaintiff, it would be difficult for the insurer
in control of the defense to contend that the verdict was based on battery (the
excluded event) rather than negligence (the covered event). The more the
insurer conducted itself, through its control of defense counsel, to ensure that
any resulting plaintiff's verdict rested on an excluded event rather than a cov-
ered event, the more susceptible the insurer is to a subsequent suit charging
"bad faith" arising out of its manipulation of its right to defend so as to
prejudice the policyholder.8 8 The conditional defense permits the insurer to
defend and contend that any resulting judgment is not covered because it falls
within the battery exclusion.89 In the coverage litigation, neither the insurer
nor the policyholder will be bound by the prior determination that the loss was
caused by the excluded event (battery) or by the included event (negligence).
In the coverage litigation, both the insurer and the policyholder may seek to
establish a favorable coverage position. While the policyholder's liability to
the plaintiff is not subject to relitigation because the insurer's control placed it
in privity with the policyholder, whether that liability is covered, i.e. is a "debt"
owed by the insurer to the policyholder, is open to litigation in the coverage
action.
86 The duty to defend is based on an analysis of the facts alleged in the claim. Even if the
legal theory asserted is not covered, a duty to defend may exist if the facts complained of
support a covered legal theory. See, e.g., Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Cedar Rapids Televi-
sion Co., 552 N.W.2d 639, 643-44 (Iowa 1996) (holding that the dismissal of the sole cov-
ered claim (malicious prosecution) in a multi-claim complaint did not terminate the insurer's
duty to defend; factual allegations contained in the joined intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim could support a malicious prosecution claim notwithstanding the previous
dismissal).
87 See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966) (finding that altercation
between policyholder and motorist was susceptible to construction of negligent self-defense
and thus potentially within coverage promise by liability insurance policy); Liquor Liab.
Joint Underwriting Assoc., 644 N.E.2d at 964.
88 The policyholder's vulnerability to the insurer's exercises of its contract rights has been a
central feature of the judicial creation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Good faith
in this context essentially means that the insurer may not exercise its contract rights in a
manner unreasonably harmful to the policyholder when the burden of the insurer's exercise
of its rights rests on the policyholder.
89 Many jurisdictions today permit the insurer to impose a conditional defense unilaterally
through a "reservation of rights" letter. First Gen. Realty Corp., 981 S.W.2d at 501. There
is some disagreement as to the prevailing rule. Compare Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Goshgarian
& Goshgarian, 726 F. Supp. 777, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (surveying case law and concluding
that "the modem trend is to find a unilateral reservation to be effective without the insured's
consent"); with 7 C JOHN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE §§ 4686, 4694 (Berdal
ed. 1979) (concluding that a majority of courts permits policyholder to reject conditional
defense and require the insurer to elect between an unconditional defense or rejection of the
tender).
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The conditional defense encourages insurers to accept tenders from their
policyholders and provides an intermediate ground between the costs of an
unconditional acceptance of the tender and the perils of a declination of the
tender. The middle ground, however, brings to the forefront a new player to
the policyholder-insurer relationship: "conflict of interest." Unlike the
"unconditional defense" model where the insurer is tightly bound to the for-
tunes of the policyholder, under the conditional defense the interests of the
policyholder and the insurer are in conflict as to the issue of indemnity cover-
age for the claim. That is not to say that conflicts of interest are alien to the
unconditional defense situation. The insurer may decide to fund a very limited
defense or gamble for a defense verdict because of low policy limits relative to
the claim's expected value.9° These conflicts do not, however, turn on cover-
age; rather, they are strategic. 9 1 In the conditional defense context, the concern
is that the insurer may use its control of the defense to influence the determina-
tion of the coverage issue.
Consider, for example, the previous hypothetical involving a claim for bat-
tery. Because the insurer controls the defense, the insurer could, through its
direction of defense counsel, attempt to shift liability to non-covered claims. In
other words, if a fact finder resolved that the policyholder was liable to the
claimant, the fact finder could be induced to do so on the basis of battery (an
event excluded from coverage) rather than negligence (an event included within
coverage). The insurer could then decline to pay indemnity for the claim based
on that finding. This is the negative consequence of permitting the insurer to
provide a conditional defense. The fear is that the insurer will use its resources
and position to achieve a conclusion that saddles the policyholder with a judg-
ment for which there is no right of indemnity. By creating a mechanism that
preserves the insurer's ability to contest that an adjudicated claim is within
90 Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the insurer
breached its duty to the policyholder to effect a settlement within policy limits when the
insurer proceeded to trial notwithstanding liability estimates strongly against its policyholder
and then advised policyholder to file for bankruptcy to secure the discharge of the excess
policy limits portion of adverse judgment). The line between a disqualifying and non-dis-
qualifying conflict may at times be difficult to find. This has proven particularly to be the
case when the "conflict" involves the policyholder's exposure to an excess verdict. See, e.g.,
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 272-73 (Miss. 1988) (finding that
interests of the insurer and the policyholder "conflict" if an actual exposure to an excess
policy limits judgment exists and an opportunity to settle within limits exists); but see CAL.
CIv. CODE § 2860(b) (West 1993) (stating that "[n]o conflict of interest shall ... be deemed
to exist solely because an insured is sued for an amount in excess of the insurance policy
limits").
91 A distinction is usually drawn between coverage conflicts and strategic conflicts. Cover-
age conflicts usually require that the insurer surrender its contractual rights to control the
defense. Strategic conflicts are less likely to be understood as depriving the insurer of its
contractual right to control the defense. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Luetmer, 474 N.W.2d
365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing different judicial responses to what constitutes a
conflict disqualifying the insurer from controlling the defense); see generally William T.
Barker, When Does the Insurer Lose the Right to Control the Defense? 58 DEF. COUNS. J.
469 (1991) (discussing situations which create a conflict of interest such as to deprive the
insurer of its contractual right to control the defense). Strategic conflicts usually come to
light only if they cause actual harm to the policyholder, i.e., cause the insurer to reject a
within limits settlement offer resulting in an excess of policy limits judgment.
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coverage, i.e., that a general verdict for the plaintiff actually involved an
excluded claim such as assault and battery, the law creates an opportunity for
abuse. Here, that opportunity presents itself in the option that the insurer would
conduct the defense so that the jury's verdict would rest solely on an excluded
claim, i.e., assault and battery. Even though the result would not be binding on
the policyholder, because it was the product of a conflict of interest, the policy-
holder would be burdened with (1) the judgment, (2) the insurer's refusal to
pay, and (3) the obligation to litigate further to secure a coverage
determination.
Courts and commentators have disagreed as to the exact contexts under
which a conditional defense creates a conflict of interest between the insurer
and the policyholder sufficient to disqualify insurers from controlling the
defense. It is not necessary to canvass that debate for I am interested here in
how courts respond to the problem posed by a conditional defense and the
consequences their solution has engendered in the context of settlement
funding.
One approach to the problem of conflict of interest is to deprive the
insurer of its power to control the defense but not its duty to provide a defense.
Just as the ability to maintain a conditional defense exploited the differences
between the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify, this approach to the
"conflict of interest" problem exploits the perceived differences between "pro-
viding" a defense and "controlling" that defense.92
I use the word "perceived" deliberately. Originally "providing" a defense
and "controlling" the defense were seen as intertwined.93 The defense was
provided not for the policyholder's benefit, but for the insurer's. The bifurca-
tion of "providing a defense" from "controlling the defense," which was devel-
oped in the conflict of interest cases, represented a profound change in the way
courts looked at the duty to defend. The duty to defend was no longer sub-
servient to the duty to indemnify, but became independent of, and in some
ways more valuable than, the duty to indemnify. The "conflict of interest"
cases followed naturally from the emergence of the defense obligation as a
separate, personal right of the policyholder. Liability insurance now was seen
as not only including the obligation to indemnify against adverse judgments on
claims within coverage, but as also including a duty to protect the policyholder
against the cost of litigation whenever a covered claim was "involved." As a
92 Two other approaches have been identified. One approach treats the "conflict of interest"
as excusing the insurer's duty to provide a defense. Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 267 A.2d
7 (N.J. 1970) (holding that when a dispute between the insurer and the policyholder over
coverage would be exacerbated by a party's control of the defense, the insurer's duty to
defend or pay for defense was excused until existence of the duty was clarified). The New
Jersey Supreme Court has, however, indicated a willingness to reconsider the Burd rule in
Trustees of Princeton Univ. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 680 A.2d 783 (N.J. Ct. App. 1996),
rev. granted, 688 A.2d 1050 (N.J. 1997). Another approach allows the insurer to continue to
control the defense but subjects the insurer to greater scrutiny in the handling of the defense.
Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Wash. 1986).
13 James Fischer, Broadening The Insurer's Duty to Defend: How Gray v. Zurich Insurance
Co. Transformed Liability Insurance Into Litigation Insurance, 25 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 141
(1991).
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result of this bifurcation, control over the defense had value not only to the
insurer but also to the policyholder.94
The main response to the convergence of "conflict of interest" and "con-
trol of the defense" was to transfer control of the defense to the policyholder
but to keep the other features of the duty to defend with the insurer. A "conflict
of interest" did not affect the insurer's duties to investigate the claim, 9 5 to settle
the claim,9 6 or to pay for the defense. The "conflict of interest," however, may
affect who controls the defense, i.e., who will select counsel to defend the
claim and instruct counsel regarding that defense.97
94 See Safeco Ins. Co. v. Ellinghouse, 725 P.2d 217, 221 (Mont. 1986); 14 COUCH INSUR-
ANCE § 51.85 (2d ed. 1985); cf In re United Indus. Serv., Inc., 85 F.3d 617 (Table) (4th Cir.
Apr. 17, 1996) (stating that loss of right to jury trial by law firm retained by the insurer
assuming control of defense constituted sufficient prejudice to estop the insurer from con-
testing coverage even though the policy by its terms did not provide coverage); see also
Bluestein & Sander v. Chicago Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2002) (holding that unrea-
sonable delays in disclaiming coverage are estopped because insured sustained prejudice
from intervening loss of control of defense).
95 Hyatt Corp. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co., 801 S.W.2d 382, 388-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(noting that the insurer has duty to consider offers of settlement within policy limits regard-
less of whether the insurer actually undertakes the defense). Whether the duty to investigate
has itself been triggered is a different matter. Paulfrey v. Blue Chip Stamps, 197 Cal. Rptr.
501, 508 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the policyholder must comply with claim and notice
requirements before the insurer's duty to investigate the claim is triggered); cf. Colonial Oil
Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters Subscribing to Policy Nos. T0315046 & T031504671, 491
S.E.2d 337 (Ga. 1997) (holding that when the claim on its face showed no coverage, the duty
to investigate did not attach until the policyholder apprised the insurer of facts sufficient to
trigger the duty to defend).
96 While the insurer that provides a conditional defense but loses control of the defense may
not be collaterally estopped from contesting coverage issues, see Am. Cas. Co. v. Corum,
885 P.2d 726, 728 (Or. App. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 894 P.2d 461 (Or. 1995), the
insurer may have a continuing obligation to attempt to effect a settlement of the claims. Cf
W. Polymer Tech. Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78, 81-82 (Ct. App. 1995)
(stating that the policyholder's right to independent counsel did not divest the insurer of its
right to settle the claim as the insurer deemed expedient). The right to settle is, of course,
distinct from the duty to settle. See supra note 42.
97 Several approaches to the issue have been recognized. The majority approach appears to
be that when there is a disqualifying conflict, the right to select defense counsel is vested
solely in the policyholder. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810,
815 (N.Y. 1981); Md. Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 355 N.E.2d 24, 31 (Ill. 1976); Joseph v. Marko-
vitz, 551 P.2d 571, 576-77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). Some decisions appear to permit the
insurer to select "independent" counsel, when there is a disqualifying conflict. See, e.g.,
Patrons Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Harmon, 732 P.2d 741, 745 (Kan. 1987) (noting that when the
insurer provides a conditional defense, the insurer should also provide independent counsel).
"Independent counsel" appears here to mean counsel without any financial or professional
ties to the insurer. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc., 777 F.2d
366, 370-71 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that long professional relationship negated claim that
counsel was independent). A third approach permits the insurer to participate in but not
control the selection process when a disqualifying conflict exists. See, e.g., Employer's Fire
Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397, 403 (R.I. 1968), abrogated on other grounds, Peerless Ins.
Co. v. Viegas, 667 A.2d 785, 789 (R.I. 1995). A fourth approach is to establish statutory
criteria which control the policyholder's discretion in selecting defense counsel when a dis-
qualifying conflict has divested the insurer of its right to control the defense. See CAL. CIv.
CODE § 2860(c) (West 1993) (requiring that independent defense counsel selected by the
policyholder have certain minimum qualifications: (1) at least five years of tort litigation
practice which includes substantial defense experience; and (2) errors and omission cover-
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This bifurcation created several problems. Quality control over counsel
selected by the policyholder has received some attention, as has cooperation
between the insurer and defense counsel selected by the policyholder.9 8 The
biggest problem is the one that has received no specific attention: what is the
approval or funding obligation of the insurer when the policyholder is in con-
trol of the defense because of a conflict of interest? If the policyholder negoti-
ates a "within policy limits" settlement and asks the insurer to approve the
settlement or fund the settlement, or both, what are the insurer's obligations and
what consequences follow if the settlement fails for lack of insurer approval or
funding? If the policyholder litigates and loses and a general verdict and judg-
ment are entered, to what extent is the insurer bound by that judgment? How
much leeway does the insurer have to contest the verdict in the underlying
action? In the insurer-breach context, the insurer acted at its peril for the
insurer was usually saddled with an adverse resolution of each of the above
questions. Do the same perils exist for the conditionally defending insurer that
fails to approve or fund a settlement negotiated by the policyholder in control
of the defense for reasons other than insurer-breach of duty to defend?
We might begin by comparing the issue of control of the defense in the
standard unconditional defense case, the insurer-breach case, and the condi-
tional defense/conflict of interest case. All consequences to the insurer that
naturally follow from its control of the defense are lacking when actual control
is exercised not by the insurer but by the policyholder. Insurer control of the
defense distinguishes the unconditional defense from insurer-breach, but
insurer control does not necessarily distinguish the unconditional defense from
the conditional defense. Under a conditional defense, the insurer may or may
not be in control of the defense depending on why the conditional defense was
interposed. Moreover, when insurer loss of control occurs, it is not due to
insurer breach of duty, but arises out of the insurer's exercise of the right to
maintain a conditional defense to preserve its ability to contest coverage. The
"conflict of interest" does not arise out of any "fault" or "wrongdoing" on the
part of the insurer or the policyholder. The "conflict of interest" simply repre-
sents a factual consequence of the exercise of contractual rights by the policy-
holder (the tender) and judicially implied rights of the insurer (the conditional
defense).
There are, however, also factors common to the conditional defense/con-
flict of interest case, the unconditional defense case, and the insurer-breach
case. While the insurer may be deprived of the power to control the defense,
the insurer may still retain the other obligations imposed by the duty to defend,
such as paying for the defense and claim adjustment. In discharging its
retained obligations, the insurer must do so consistent with its duty of good
age. The insurer's payment obligation is, moreover, capped at the amount the insurer usu-
ally pays defense counsel it retains to defend its policyholders for similar type claims. Id.
98 See CAL. CIv. CODE § 2860(c), discussed supra note 97; see generally Charles Silver,
When Should Government Regulate Lawyer-Client Relationships? A Call For Inaction (to
be published in a forthcoming issue of the University of Arizona Law Review; paper on file
with the author) (discussing on-going battle between defense counsel and insurers, as waged
in the courts and bar ethics committees, over (1) litigation guidelines imposed by insurers on
retained defense counsel and (2) billing audits).
[Vol. 2:1
THE DUTY TO FUND SETTLEMENTS
faith and fair dealing. The insurer's ability to carry out its retained obligations
may, however, be impacted by its loss of control. For example, the insurer's
ability to investigate and evaluate settlement may be impaired if the policy-
holder does not share litigation discovery with the insurer. Whether and to
what extent claim adjustment obligations should be imposed on the insurer
after it has lost the power to control the defense due to a conflict of interest
remains an unresolved area of the law.
To explore these issues, let us assume a policyholder negotiated settlement
of the hypothetical battery claim discussed earlier. The claimant will accept an
amount equal to "policy limits." Let us also assume that there is a greater than
remote chance that if the settlement is not completed and the matter goes to
trial, an "excess policy limits" verdict is possible. The policyholder has insuffi-
cient assets to fund the settlement and the claimant insists on immediate fund-
ing as a condition of settlement. In other words, the settlement will fail unless
it is funded by the insurer. How should the insurer respond to the funding
request by the policyholder?
The insurer may have two concerns regarding the settlement. First, the
insurer may believe that the claim is outside coverage. This was the basis for
the conditional defense. The insurer's willingness to fund the settlement will
thus be highly correlated to its position on coverage and its confidence that its
position will be accepted as legitimate or as being based on good faith.99 Sec-
ond, the insurer may oppose settlement for strategic reasons believing either
that the policyholder should not have settled or that the policyholder settled for
too much. The insurer may believe the claim is defensible and that any settle-
ment is unwise." ° If the insurer's policy limits are the sole source of funding,
the insurer may believe that the policyholder failed to evaluate settlement
options with the same degree of care and prudence that the policyholder would
have exhibited if its own money were at risk.
A different constellation of considerations affect the conditionally defend-
ing insurer that retains control of the defense. If the insurer's range of consid-
erations in evaluating settlement offers is limited, the issue of funding the
settlement is largely mooted. The failure to settle exposes the insurer to
extracontractual damages based on a breach of duty theory. If the insurer is
permitted to resist settlement based on reasonable doubts regarding coverage,
99 Many jurisdictions treat the insurer's refusal to settle as being in good faith if coverage is
"reasonably debatable." If the insurer errs in good faith, the policyholder is limited to con-
tractual damages, which would be policy limits. See, e.g., Mowry v. Badger State Mut. Cas.
Co., 385 N.W.2d 171, 179-80 (Wis. 1986). Some jurisdictions refuse to permit the insurer to
use doubts about coverage as an excuse for failing to resolve a claim. See, e.g., Johansen v.
Cal. State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744, 748-49 (Cal. 1975) (holding that the
only permissible consideration the insurer in control of the defense may allow for in evaluat-
ing a settlement offer is whether, in light of the claimant's injuries and probable liability of
the policyholder, the ultimate judgment is likely to exceed policy limits). Whether Johansen
would be applied when the insurer does not control the defense is unresolved.
10O The insurer may have reputational interests that discourage settlement. See Gross &
Syverud, supra note 82, at 52 (noting that strategic bargaining requires strategic intransi-
gence and thus defendants will persist in low ball offers across the board even if in some
cases raising the offer would be justified on the merits); see also Gross & Syverud, supra
note 24
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the issue of funding settlements becomes critical to settlement clearance rates.
The importance of the resolution of the issue of settlement funding is funda-
mental.'0 t If the insurer must fund the settlement immediately, the insurer is
relegated to an after-the-fact recoupment action against the policyholder.1 °2
When the insurer defends conditionally but retains control of the defense, the
insurer funds the settlement, more out of custom and habit, or perhaps caution,
than declared rule of law. The insurer has been allowed to seek recoupment
from the policyholder on the basis that the claim settled was not covered. 10 3
Should a conditionally defending insurer not in control of the defense have the
same settlement funding obligations as have been "assumed" to exist when the
insurer controls the defense?"° The position asserted here is that it should
not: the obligation to fund a settlement should follow control of the defense, not
the duty to defend.
101 In Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038 (Cal.
1980), the court addressed the converse problem of the policyholder who chose to litigate
rather than settle. In that context, the court stated the policyholder in control of the defense
did not owe an excess insurer a duty to accept a reasonable settlement that would not impact
the excess coverage. Id. at 1043. The policyholder's strategic decision to reject the offer
within the self-insured retention and litigate for a defense verdict resulted in a judgment that
required a monetary contribution by the excess insurer.
102 These reimbursement cases can be a technical morass. See, e.g., Med. Malpractice Joint
Underwriting Ass'n of Mass. v. Goldberg, 680 N.E.2d 1121 (Mass. 1997):
Where an insurer defends under a reservation of rights to later disclaim coverage, as JUA did
here, it may later seek reimbursement for an amount paid to settle the underlying tort action only
if the insured has agreed that the insurer may commit the insured's own funds to a reasonable
settlement with the right later to seek reimbursement from the insured, or if the insurer secures
specific authority to reach a particular settlement which the insured agrees to pay. The insurer
may also notify the insured of a reasonable settlement offer and give the insured an opportunity
to accept the offer or assume its own defense. None of those conditions was met by JUA. Its
original reservation of rights letter sent to Goldberg did not make any reference to settlement or
to its right later to claim for reimbursement of any settlement. Nor does the correspondence with
Barshak provide the necessary authority. JUA did not notify Goldberg of the settlement offer
received from Witherspoon and JUA did not give Goldberg the opportunity to accept that settle-
ment, or to assume his own defense.
Id. at 1129 (footnotes omitted).
103 The whole area of conditional defenses and the insurer's ability to litigate coverage
issues remains an area of substantial decisional uncertainty. See supra note 89; see also
Jacob v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 553 N.W.2d 800, 805 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
"the law does not bind the insurer to the tactics and strategy selected by the insured's attor-
ney, thereby depriving the insurer of its coverage defense if that strategy should fail"); com-
pare Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., Ltd., 875 P.2d 894, 911 (Haw. 1994)
(holding that "[clollateral estoppel applied between the insured and insurer is predicated
upon an assumed identity of interests of the parties to the contract of indemnity in opposing
the injured person's claim") (citing Farmers Ins. Co. v. Vagnozzi, 675 P.2d 703, 706 (Ariz.
1983)). While collateral estoppel would not apply to those issues as to which the interests of
the policyholder and the insurer were in conflict, it is unclear whether the presence of a
conflict as to some issues would divest the prior adjudication of any collateral estoppel
effect. See Manzanita Park, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 857 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding the better rule is to suspend operation of collateral estoppel even issues as to which
policyholder and insurer share a common interest when there is a conflict of interest).
104 The basis for the "assumption" is discussed at supra notes 105-06 and accompanying
text
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Limiting the value of the insurer's "right" to contest indemnity coverage
by requiring settlement funding effectively reduces the practical value of the
conditional defense. By offering a conditional defense, the insurer may lose
control of the defense. A conditional defense, even with a right of recoupment
against the policyholder, could be strategically worse for the insurer than an
unconditional acceptance of the tender. If the conditionally defending insurer
not in control of the defense is required to fund a settlement negotiated by the
policyholder, then the insurer may prefer to exercise control of the defense to
protect its interests by minimizing its defense costs and avoiding the policy-
holder's biases towards settlement. It must be borne in mind that at the time
the insurer offers the conditional defense, the insurer cannot always foresee
whether the policyholder is entitled to claim control over the defense and, if so,
whether the policyholder will exercise that right. Consequently, offering a con-
ditional defense is not risk free even in jurisdictions which permit the insurer to
impose a conditional defense unilaterally through a reservation of rights. The
insurer must consider the risk of loss of control. This risk is enhanced if the
loss of control does not affect the insurer's settlement funding obligation.
The alternative of permitting the insurer to refuse to fund a settlement
when conditionally defending but not in control of the defense also raises
problems. The loss of a funding source for settlement hollows out policyholder
control of the defense whenever the policyholder is prevented from exercising
the power of closure that a settlement provides. In some cases, the policy-
holder has nothing to offer to induce the claimant to compromise the claim:
any settlement must be "subject to" the subsequent action in which the insurer's
indemnity obligations will be determined. If there is no coverage, the real
value of the settlement may be zero. This reality may encourage the policy-
holder to enlist the claimant as an ally against the insurer in an effort to induce
a settlement by directing the claimant toward a solvent defendant. Any resolu-
tion of this problem will impose some costs on one of the parties to the insur-
ance contract.
A few cases have finessed the issue by distinguishing between advancing
funds and paying an indemnity. These cases have all followed the same gen-
eral theme. The insurer has conditionally defended under a reservation of
rights and retained control of the defense. The reservation of rights has
included a provision stating that if the insurer settles the case, the insurer will
look to the policyholder for reimbursement of the funds advanced if it is subse-
quently determined that the claim is not covered. The presence of a reimburse-
ment obligation in a document drafted by the insurer can reasonably be
construed as including the implied promise that the insurer will advance the
funds necessary to settle the claim, at least up to policy limits. Courts have
generally upheld these reimbursement provisions. 0 5 The courts have also
stated that the presence of a reimbursement provision is required if the insurer
105 See, e.g., Omaha Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cardon Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 502, 504-05 (N.D.
Cal. 1988); Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, 22 P.3d 313 (Cal. 2001) (indemnity); Buss v.
Sup. Ct., 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997) (defense costs).
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wishes to recoup the settlement costs from the policyholder.' 06 This, of course,
begs the question and places the insurer in a "Catch 22" position: include a
reimbursement provision and incur an obligation to fund the settlement, or omit
the reimbursement provision and lose the right to recoup the settlement funds
advanced, but still perhaps have a duty to advance funds. The courts have not
resolved whether a conditionally defending insurer, with or without a reim-
bursement provision in its reservation of rights letter, must fund a reasonable
settlement before the insurer has obtained a coverage determination.
The resolution of the question whether the conditionally defending insurer
must advance settlement funds cannot be obtained from the language of the
insurance contract. On this issue the policy is silent. One could infer that the
absence of an express, independent "duty to settle" should be interpreted as
excusing the insurer from having an obligation to advance settlement funds in
the conditional defense setting. Courts have, however, proven to be noticeably
reluctant to read the gaps in an insurance contract in a manner favorable to
insurers except in matters when doing so would be wholly consistent with clear
public policies. The conditional defense/settlement funding issue may not rise
to this level. Reasonable arguments can be made for both requiring and excus-
ing the insurer from funding a settlement when conditionally defending. The
resolution requires a balanced, nuanced approach to the problem. Any solution
must reflect the abilities of the parties to protect their own interests and
represent a coherent and consistent approach to identifying the obligations and
rights of the parties to the insurance contract. I will attempt such a reconcilia-
tion in Part VI of this article.
Decisions addressing policyholder settlement in derogation of the insurer's
right to control the defense are only indirectly on point because the key issue in
those decisions is liability for the settlement, not the timing of any funding
obligation; nonetheless, the decisions use approaches to the problem that are
helpful here. One approach is that the policyholder's breach and intrusion into
the insurer's right of control excuses the insurer from its duty to indemnify."0 7
'06 See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (discussing ability of conditionally
defending insurer advancing settlement funds to secure reimbursement from the
policyholder).
1"7 See Romstadt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 608, 613-14 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
"[w]here the insurer did not refuse to defend its insured," the insured's breach of the clause
prohibiting voluntary payments to the claimant by the policyholder will be enforced and the
policyholder's breach of that provision will not be excused). The cases become more con-
flicted when the insurer has the power but not the duty to defend as, for example, is the case
with excess insurers. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 687 N.E.2d 785,
793 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (holding that policyholder's voluntary settlement without notice to
excess insurers constituted breach of contract excusing insurer's duty to pay); but see Cessna
Aircraft Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 900 F. Supp. 1489, 1517-18 (D. Kan. 1995)
(holding that policyholder's breach of no voluntary payment provision did not excuse excess
insurer's duty to pay absent a showing of prejudice to interests of insurers).
A similar approach is seen in the decisions when the issue involves the policyholder's
failure to cooperate in the defense of the claim. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
Davies, 310 S.E.2d 167 (Va. 1983) (permitting the insurer that had accepted tender of the
defense to raise in garnishment action the policyholder's failure to cooperate and assist in the
defense). The jurisdictions vary as to whether the failure to cooperate must prejudice the
insurer and, if so, the measure of prejudice. JERRY, supra note 1, at § 110.
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The "excuse" approach straightforwardly emphasizes the policyholder's
"breach" as the determinative factor in decision analysis. A significant minor-
ity of jurisdictions have, however, adopted an alternative approach. These
jurisdictions downplay the issue of breach and replace it with the concept of
prejudice.' 8 Under the "prejudice" approach, the insurer's duty to indemnify is
not excused by the policyholder's breach unless the insurer can show actual
harm caused by the policyholder's actions. In effect, the insurer must show
that it could have compromised the claim for less or successfully defeated the
claim but for the intervention of the policyholder. This may be a difficult
proof. The insurer cannot expect any assistance here from either the claimant
or the policyholder because any assistance rendered to the insurer would under-
mine the settlement the claimant and policyholder negotiated and jointly wish
to assert against the insurer.
Different value systems may be identified as reflecting differences in judi-
cial attitudes as to whether the policyholder's independent settlement deprives
the insurer of the substantial benefits of the bargain. The view that treats the
policyholder's settlement as excusing the insurer's performance holds that the
right to control the defense has substantial value in its own right. This view
treats the insurer's right to control the defense as integral to its ability to reduce
its claim expense and prevent claimants from exploiting differences between
policyholders and insurers to obtain settlements at sums the insurer is unpre-
pared to offer."° Because loss experience influences both functions, this view
may be seen as long term since it ties into the insurer's claim adjusting and
underwriting functions. It may be expected, as discussed previously, that
insurer control of the defense will result in settlement costs on average lower
than policyholder controlled settlements when the policyholder is settling with
the insurer's money.'o The "excuse" approach would thus couple the insurer's
108 Many of these decisions involve the interplay between uninsured or underinsured motor-
ist coverage and the insurer's subrogation rights against the tortfeasor. Standard coverage
usually finds the policyholder suing the tortfeasor and looking to the insurer to cover the
difference between the tortfeasor liability limits, if any, and the policyholder's uninsured/
underinsured limits. The insurer is protected from collusive or unreasonable settlements
between the policyholder and tortfeasor, which would shift the costs of policyholder's claim
to the insurer, by the presence of a consent to settle provision. A debate exists whether the
breach of the consent clause by the policyholder excuses the insurer's duty to pay absent a
showing of prejudice, i.e., the insurer could have collected more from the tortfeasor. Feder-
ated Serv. Inc. Co. v. Grandos, 889 P.2d 1312, 1314 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (adopting prejudice
requirement on the theory that "consent-to-settle" provision is a "condition to" rather than an
"exclusion from" coverage); contra Motorist Mut. Ins. Co. v. Handlovie, 492 N.E.2d 417,
419 (Ohio 1986); March v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 687 P.2d 1040, 1044 (N.M.
1984). See also Malmin v. Minn. Mut. Fire & Cas. Co., 552 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 1996)
(collecting decisions discussing whether consent to settle clause is enforceable in a no fault
jurisdiction and adopting the position that it is not).
109 Ill. Masonic Med. Ctr. v. Turegum Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 611, 613 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(noting that control of the defense permits insurers to protect their financial interests in the
outcome of the litigation and to minimize unwarranted liability claims); see generally Doug-
las Richmond, Liability Insurer's Right to Defend Their Insureds, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV.
115, 116 (2001) (noting benefits of control of the defense for insurers).
110 There is, of course, the strategic possibility that if the policyholder cannot call on the
insurer's resources this may benefit the policyholder's bargaining position. See, e.g., Md.
Cas. Co. v. Knight, 96 F.3d 1284, 1294 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that policyholder's bank-
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funding obligation to its control of the defense. If the insurer was not in control
of the defense, for reasons other than breach, the "excuse" approach suggests
that no funding obligation should be recognized until the issue of indemnity
was resolved.
The "prejudice" view emphasizes the near or short term consequences of
the policyholder's conduct. If the policyholder settles the case for a reasonable
amount, this view treats the insurer as not having been deprived of the substan-
tial benefits of the bargain. Under this view, the policyholder's breach requires
a showing of harm (prejudice) to be actionable."' This "prejudice" approach
decouples funding and control. It suggests that the conditionally defending
insurer who has lost control of the defense, for reasons other than breach, must
fund a settlement negotiated by the policyholder unless the insurer can show
actual harm, i.e., the settlement was unreasonable, fraudulent, or the product of
collusion and, thus, resulted in a settlement substantially in excess of the actual
value of the claim.
V. THE NON-STANDARD CASE: POLICYHOLDER IN CONTROL OF THE
DEFENSE PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
The policyholder may contractually assume control of the defense. This
may arise for a variety of reasons. The insurance contract may be a pure
indemnity contract.1 12 Alternatively, the policyholder may have a large self-
insured retention or the policyholder may be using a non-traditional form of
insurance, such as a captive or a fronting policy." 3 Each of these alternative
insuring formats effectively places the policyholder in the role assumed by a
primary insurer with responsibility for the working layer of coverage.
ruptcy probably enhanced policyholder's bargaining leverage); THOMAS SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1963) (noting that in bargaining, "weakness" can be a strength
when it forces an adversary to make concessions that a weak party cannot make because it is
weak). While I do not discount the possibility that financial insolvency, or the perception
thereof, may discourage claimants, the presence of liability insurance usually reflects the
purchaser's informed decision that she has assets that warrant protection from the risk of
civil litigation and civil liability.
1 1 New Eng. Extrusion, Inc. v. Am. Alliance Ins. Co., 874 F. Supp. 467, 470-71 (D. Mass.
1995) (holding that policyholder's voluntary settlement in breach of voluntary payments
provision of policy did not excuse insurer's performance absent showing of prejudice).
112 The fact that a policy is written as a pure indemnity policy is not necessarily controlling.
If the insurer has agreed to reimburse the policyholder for defense costs on an "as accrued"
basis, the insurer's failure to reimburse those costs has been treated by some courts as
equivalent to the breach of the duty to defend and permit extracontractual remedies. See
Lexington Ins. Co. v. Devaney, 50 F.3d 15 (Table), 1995 WL 105985, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 9,
1995) (citing Xebec Dev. Partners, Ltd. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726,
739 (Ct. App. 1993)); compare Valassis Communications, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 97
F.3d 870, 876 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that under Michigan law provision in insurance con-
tract providing for reimbursement of defense costs does not create duty to defend).
"I A "captive" is an insuring entity that is owned by the policyholder. Westchester Fire
Ins. Co. v. Heddington Ins. Ltd., 883 F. Supp. 158, 160 n.4 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd 84 F.3d
432 (5th Cir. 1996) (Table). A "fronting" arrangement involves an insurer which allows its
name to be used by the nominal policyholder. The policyholder agrees to pay the fronting
insurer a fee and to hold it harmless from all losses relating to the fronted policy.
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The critical issue is whether the policyholder in control of the defense
owes the same duties of good faith and fair dealing to the insurer that the
insurer in control of the defense owes the policyholder. Note that the implicit
assumption beneath the argument is that the policyholder's conduct of the
defense is to some extent binding on the insurer. If the insurer is free to litigate
all aspects of the validity of the claim and its coverage under the insurance
contract, the need to hold the policyholder to good faith in the conduct of the
defense is substantially reduced, if not eliminated.
In addressing the issue of "good faith," policyholders have usually argued
literalism and definition: a policyholder is not an insurer; therefore, the rules
applicable to insurers in control of the defense do not apply to policyholders in
control of the defense, even for policyholders acting like insurers. Insurers
have made the "walks like a duck" argument: a policyholder that acts like an
insurer, should be held to the standards imposed on insurers in control of the
defense. Although the case law is thin, the policyholders' position has seen
more success in this area than the insurers'. As long as the policyholder seeks
to advance no more than its own litigation-related, economic interests, the poli-
cyholder's conduct does not provide the insurer with an excuse for non-per-
formance." 4 Insurer successes have involved instances of policyholder
duplicity and overreaching." 5 A few courts have suggested that the policy-
holder's discretion is circumscribed by the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, but those cases have involved the policyholder's failure to give
notice, rather than poor claims handling or claims evaluation." 6
Although there are some similarities between the policyholder in control
cases due to conffict of interest and the policyholder in control cases due to
agreement between the parties, I do not believe the categories are congruent.
114 The model case involves a policyholder who rejects a settlement that would avoid
breaching the policyholder's self-insured retention. This is the converse of the insurer's
failure to settle the case. Here, if the policyholder erroneously rejects the offer, the insurer
pays. Nonetheless, the unanimous judicial response is to allow the policyholder to prefer its
own economic interests by rejecting the offer in the hope of doing better later. See, e.g.,
Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Key Pharm., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 657, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Int'l
Ins. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 841 S.W.2d 437, 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1992); Commercial
Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038 (Cal. 1980). A similar con-
flict arises when the policyholder is self-insured and an insurer seeks to avail itself of its
other insurance clause. Here the decisions are less uniform but still appear to favor the
policyholder on the rationale that "self-insurance" is not "insurance." See generally James
Fischer, The Presence of Insurance and the Legal Allocation of Risk, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 1,
40-44 (1996).
"' Cf Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. N. Star Reinsurance Corp., 153 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682-83 (Ct.
App. 1979) (holding that an excess insurer was not bound by claim assignments to particular
policy periods agreed to between the policyholder and the primary insurer when the assign-
ments operated to expand the excess insurer's obligations and limit the primary insurer's
obligations); see also First State Underwriters Agency of New Eng. Reinsurance Corp. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 803 F.2d 1308, 1314-15 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that the excess insurer
may challenge the dates of loss assigned by the policyholder and the primary insurer); Home
Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 665 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same), affd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 902 F.2d 1111 (2nd Cir. 1990).
116 N. Am. Van Lines v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 So. 2d 1325, 1331-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996); Diamond Heights Homeowners Ass'n v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 277 Cal. Rptr. 906, 914
(Ct. App. 1991).
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The chief similarity is the absence of breach. The differences, however, are
more significant. When the policyholder controls the defense by agreement
with the insurer, the parties have constructed the relationship so that policy-
holder control of the defense is the desired result. Both the policyholder and
the insurer may be seen to have agreed that the insurer's obligation to provide
indemnity will to some extent be controlled by the policyholder's handling of
the claims. While the insurer has not expressly agreed to follow the fortunes of
the policyholder," 17 the insurer is not well positioned, given the structure of the
relationship, to contend that it can be indifferent and unaffected by the actions
of the policyholder. The settlement or judgment will probably be deemed bind-
ing on the insurer if the policyholder acted reasonably." 8 It must be reempha-
sized, however, that binding the carrier to the underlying claim resolution is
distinct from the determination whether that underlying claim is covered by the
insurance contract. 19
VI. A SUGGESTED UNIFOR-M APPROACH TO FUNDING SETTLEMENTS FOR
NON-STANDARD, NON-BREACH CASES
This paper has identified several exceptions to the standard case of the
unconditionally defending insurer. These include:
1. The insurer in breach of its duty to defend;
2. The conditionally defending insurer that retains control of the defense;
3. The conditionally defending insurer that loses control of the defense;
4. The insurer that cedes by contract control of the defense to the
policyholder.
The insurer-breach cases have dominated the decisional law. It would be
a mistake, however, to extend the doctrine of the breach cases to non-breach
contexts. The absence of fault in the non-breach cases negates a direct applica-
tion of the insurer-breach model created by the courts. The non-breach, non-
standard case must be analyzed on the basis of criteria that recognize that the
117 In the reinsurance context, the relationship is controlled by the "follow the fortunes"
provision, which has been held to bind the reinsurer to the claim decisions made by the
ceding insurer. N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1199 (3d Cir.
1995) (stating that "follow the fortunes" clauses prevent reinsurers from second guessing
good faith settlements and obtaining de novo review of judgments of the reinsured's liability
to its insured [the ceding insurer]"); Debra Baker, The Effect of Evidence of Industry Custom
and Practice and the Parties' Course of Dealing on the Application of "Follow the For-
tunes" in Reinsurance Contracts, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 947 (1996). Follow the fortunes or
follow the settlements provisions have generally been limited to reinsurance contracts and
have not spread to other contexts where the policyholder is in control of the defense by
agreement.
118 See Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 729-
30 (Ct. App. 1996); Monarch Cortland v. Columbia Cas. Co., 646 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (App.
Div. 1996); cf UNR Indus., Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 942 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1991)
(stating that an excess insurer could not contest the reasonableness of a settlement entered in
its absence and without its participation. Collusion was deemed not a concern because the
settlement was approved in adversarial proceedings before the bankruptcy court and the
insurer's position had been represented by other parties.
119 Cf. Gulf Res. & Chem. Corp. v. Gavine, 763 F. Supp. 1073, 1077-78 (D. Idaho 1991)
(holding that there was no obligation on part of excess insurer to pay uncovered claim that
was settled by the policyholder).
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situation, while not unforeseeable, is largely unprovided for under the terms of
the insurance contract. Because the problem is foreseeable, courts should adopt
an approach which (1) is consistent with the contractual relationship that exists
between insurer and policyholder, (2) advances policies for which liability
insurance is directed, namely, the use of insurance as a source of funds for
dispute resolution, yet (3) does not unduly distort the objective bargain reached
by the parties.
While there are differences between the non-standard, non-breach catego-
ries, a uniform approach to the program is both available and preferable. Even
if the insurer has continuing claim adjustment responsibilities that are indepen-
dent of its litigation defense obligations, the close nexus between control of the
litigation defense and settlement, particularly settlement tactics, warrants an
approach that marries the two concerns rather than separates them. Such an
approach is available and feasible. Settlement funding obligations should be
initially assigned to the party in actual control of the defense. Reimbursement
for settlement funds advanced should be allowed. The insurer in control of the
defense would have a right of reimbursement when it funded a settlement if it
was subsequently determined that no duty to indemnify existed. The policy-
holder in control of the defense, for reasons other than insurer breach, would
have a right of reimbursement when it funded the settlement of a claim for
which the insurer had a duty to indemnify. Reimbursement should not, how-
ever, be conditioned on the party funding the settlement giving the reimbursing
party an opportunity to consent or object to the settlement.
A. The Party In Control of the Defense Should Advance Funds To Settle
The Claim
Funding should be attached to control because settlement has become an
ingrained part of the civil justice system, particularly in the personal injury/
property damage fields in which liability insurance is centrally located. Efforts
to bifurcate settlement of the suit from control of the defense are impractical
and inefficient.
Impracticality is the product of the demands of the litigation system which
requires that a defense be aligned with the economic and litigation realities of
the case. A matter with an expected value of $1,000,000 is a different case
from a matter with an expected value of $1,000. Pretrial strategy and negotia-
tion strategy are not tactics that are kept in separate boxes; one being put away
when the other is being used. Pretrial strategy (control of the defense) is inex-
tricably connected with negotiation and settlement strategy. How much and
what type of discovery to conduct, whether expert witnesses should be retained
now or later or ever, whether to move for summary adjudication, are all issues
that are influenced, and in turn influence, negotiation looking to dispute resolu-
tion. An adversary's valuation of a claim must necessarily be influenced by
what is learned and by what is disclosed through the pre-trial; however, control
of the defense is control over pre-trial. Bifurcating responsibility for control of
the defense from responsibility for claim valuation for settlement purposes is
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highly likely to raise litigation costs due to miscommunication and misdirection
between the party responsible for each of the bifurcated tasks. 12
0
Having to maintain open lines of communication with multiple persons to
resolve the dispute may be counterproductive and inefficient. The fact that
multiple persons face a common adversary (the claimant) cannot completely
override the fact that the personal, business, and litigation interests of the
insurer and the policyholder do not always coincide. Of course, the absence of
coherence will have to be addressed eventually, but it is dangerous to require
the parties to resolve their differences while they face a common opponent who
may seek to exploit their differences for the opponent's advantage through
divide and conquer tactics. 12  Moreover, the need to communicate in order to
conclude the dispute raises transaction costs by increasing the number of par-
ties needed to resolve the dispute from two (claimant and party in control of the
defense) to three (claimant, party in control of the defense, and person who
must advance settlement funds to resolve dispute).
Situating settlement funding responsibility in the party having control of
the defense is most acceptable in two of the non-standard cases: (1) the condi-
tionally defending insurer retains control of the defense; and, (2) the policy-
holder is contractually given control of the defense. In both of these cases, the
party is in control because it has bargained for control and the party that ceded
control did so consciously and voluntarily. The same bargain that gave one of
the parties control also could have addressed, and sometimes does address,
interim funding obligations.1 2 2 The absence of specific attention to the funding
issue in the contract suggests a rule that would parallel the customary expecta-
tions of the parties. For the reasons discussed in this paper, the customary
expectation should be to couple funding with control. This is enhanced when,
as here, the parties have contractually structured a relationship that is expressly
based on "after-the-fact" reimbursement rather than pre-funding.
120 Courts have noted that bifurcation of settlement authority and litigation responsibility
results in obstacles to judicial calendar management and dispute clearance rates. See In re
Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1407-08 (1lth Cir. 1991).
121 Commentators have noted the possibility of the claimant exploiting the insurer-policy-
holder relationship for personal gain. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Profes-
sional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Counsel, 1995 DUKE L.J. 255; Stephen
Schmidt, The Bad Faith Set Up, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 705 (1994).
122 Insurance contracts can provide for the obligation to fund a settlement subject to reim-
bursement if it is ultimately determined that the funding party is entitled to indemnity or
restitution. For example, pure excess insurance contracts usually provide through the "ulti-
mate net loss" and "loss payable" provisions that the policyholder have paid the loss before
the insurer's duty to pay arises. Such language is usually respected and enforced by the
courts. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 994 F.2d 1254, 1257-58 (7th
Cir. 1993); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gilmore, 812 P.2d 977, 980 (Ariz.
1991) (finding that with excess insurance, scheduled underlying coverage "operate[s] as a
kind of deductible, and 'an insured pays a reduced premium to the excess insurer expressly
because that insurer will be obligated to pay a claim only after a certain amount has been
paid' by the insured's primary insurer") (citation omitted).
Whether "actual payment" should be required in the settlement funding context is prob-
lematic. Actual payment is a good signal that the settlement was reasonable. On the other
hand, payment may be beyond the financial resources of the party in control of the defense.
If the claimant will settle and defer collection until coverage is resolved, interposing a pay-
ment requirement can be seen as an irrelevant formality.
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Control of the defense necessarily affects claim value and the price for
which the claim may be compromised. Bifurcating defense and settlement
complicates each party's ability to control the defense and comply with the
related duties of assistance, cooperation, and good faith. For example, if the
insurer had defense obligations and control but no funding obligation, defense
counsel would be retained by the insurer for that limited purpose. The claimant
(and his lawyer) would, therefore, need to communicate directly with the poli-
cyholder regarding settlement funding. Although the policyholder is not being
represented by defense counsel as to settlement, it is unclear whether communi-
cations between the policyholder and claimant's counsel would be ethically
proper.'23 These "back channel" communications would, moreover, tend to
undermine the more formal relationship between the policyholder and retained
defense counsel. The policyholder could, moreover, be placed in a precarious
position whenever its efforts on its own behalf to settle the claim conflict with
the insurer's defense strategy. Efforts by the insurer to supervise or exercise
oversight of the settlement process would be inconsistent with the insurer's "no
duty to settle" position and could independently subject the insurer, or defense
counsel, to liability. Any policyholder funding of a settlement negotiated or
encouraged by the insurer could give rise to claims of insurer coercion and
duress of the policyholder.1 24
Assigning the funding obligation to the conditionally defending insurer
when it is in control of the defense appears to be a pragmatic resolution of the
problem. The insurer has some protection through the reimbursement mecha-
nism, although the value of reimbursement is, of course, proportionate to the
financial solvency of the policyholder. It permits the insurer to exercise mean-
ingful control of the defense and avoids thrusting the policyholder into situa-
tions where its conduct may raise assistance and cooperation issues, unless the
policyholder is permitted to look exclusively, and without penalty, to its own
interest in considering settlement. Most importantly, imposing a limited fund-
ing obligation on conditionally defending insurers in control of the defense pro-
motes settlements. While courts occasionally assert that coverage decisions are
not dictated by a desire to provide compensation to claimants by maximizing
coverage, the reality is, I believe, otherwise.' 25 In this context, the insurer's
123 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1983) (prohibiting communication by a
lawyer representing a client with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer, when the communication concerns the subject of the representation, without the
consent of the other lawyer).
124 See, e.g., J.B. Aguerre, Inc. v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837, 842
(Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that the insurer potentially can be liable for coercing a policy-
holder to contribute to a settlement fund when the case settled within policy limits).
125 Compare Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(adopting coverage position (continuous trigger) on the ground, among others, that it would
maximize the amount of available insurance for the policyholder), with Owens-Ill., Inc. v.
United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 981 (N.J. 1995) (stating that "the presumption of maximizing
coverage ... appears an uneven principle in this setting .... A rule of law premised on
nothing more than the result-oriented goal of maximizing coverage has been described as
'judicial legislation'") (citation omitted); Abex Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 790 F.2d 119, 126
n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that goal of "maximizing coverage" is result oriented).
I have attempted to chronicle what I contend is the consistent judicial tendency to match
insurance with the party who bears the risk of loss in James Fischer, The Presence of Insur-
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interest in protecting its funds by retaining control may be balanced against
increasing the amount, and speeding the delivery, of compensation to injured
claimants.
A court creating a middle ground position (here the conditional defense)
may attach such burdens to the position as are appropriate given the tradeoffs a
middle ground position represents. Within the ambit of claims legitimately
raising a conditional defense is the subset of claims that are covered and for
which the insurer has full indemnity obligations and a subset of claims that are
not covered and for which no indemnity is owed. We cannot resolve the matter
based on the assumption that the conditionally defended claim is or is not cov-
ered. If the claim is not covered, imposing any funding obligation on the
insurer seems wrong. The insurer should not be forced to pay non-covered
claims in the guise of discharging its duty to defend covered, or potentially
covered, claims. If, however, the claim is covered, imposing only a limited,
after-the-fact funding obligation on the insurer seems wrong. The insurer
should not be able to reduce its indemnity obligations by criticizing the breadth
of its defense obligations. The correct perspective is that of uncertainty whether
the claim is covered. It is from the perspective of uncertainty that the legal rule
must be prescribed that assigns the benefits and burdens of a conditional
defense. Under these conditions of uncertainty, assigning a funding obligation
to the party that has contractually assumed control of the defense is neither
improper nor unwarranted; rather, it reflects a sharing of the possible outcomes
in a manner that permits both insurer and policyholder to protect their own
positions without inflicting unreasonable harm on the other.
This leaves the case involving the policyholder in control of the defense
due to the presence of a coverage conflict of interest. The central objection to
requiring the policyholder in control of the defense due to a coverage conflict
to fund a settlement is that it deprives the policyholder of a benefit that it is
entitled to under the contract - insurer adjustment of the claim. It is the com-
mon understanding of the concept of claim adjustment that the insurer initially
determines the amount that will be offered to settle the claim - and thus the
amount of indemnity the policyholder is entitled to recover under the insurance
contract. Decoupling the funding obligation from the adjusting function
appears to eviscerate the purpose of insurer adjustment.
The problem with the evisceration argument, as applied to this situation, is
that it decides the contested issue by assuming that the insurer must advance
funds even though it has properly reserved its rights to contest its indemnity
obligations. The position advanced here preserves the insurer's right to reserve
its indemnity obligation while recognizing that some neutral mechanism needs
to be identified that addresses the practical need of assigning to one of the
parties to the insurance contract an interim funding obligation. While courts
could decide to impose such an obligation on the insurer, such a decision would
unwisely extend the insurer's defense obligation by effectively collapsing the
defense and indemnity obligations under the broader duty to defend test. In
other words, whenever the duty to defend was triggered, the conditionally
ance and the Legal Allocation of Risk, 2 CONN. L.J. 1 (1996). I concede my perception is
based primarily on intuition and analysis of a limited set of appellate decisions, but I have
found few counter-examples.
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defending insurer would have a duty to fund settlements, whether negotiated by
it or by the policyholder due to a conflict of interest. I believe that assigning
the funding obligation to the conditionally defending insurer in control of the
defense is justified not by reference to the insurance contract, for the insurance
contract is silent here, but is justified by the demands of conducting a defense
and the impracticality and inefficiency of the bifurcation alternative. These
same reasons warrant assigning the funding obligation, subject to reimburse-
ment, to the policyholder who elects to control the defense through the selec-
tion of independent counsel when a disqualifying conflict of interest precludes
the insurer from exercising its contractual right to control the defense.
B. Reimbursement of Funds Advanced Should Not Be Conditioned On the
Obtaining of Informed Consent From the Party With Final
Responsibility for Payment
Reimbursement of settlement funds advanced by the conditionally defend-
ing insurer has generally been based on consent, not restitution.126 The distinc-
tion is between a duty based on voluntary assumption of an obligation (consent)
as opposed to the involuntary imposition of an obligation to avoid unjust
enrichment (restitution). Under a consent theory, the parties to the bargain cre-
ate the obligation; under a restitution theory, the obligation is created by law.
"Consent" of the policyholder to reimbursement of the conditionally defending
insurer is today usually obtained by inclusion of a reimbursement provision in
the reservation of rights letter. ' 27 If the policyholder does not object, the condi-
tional defense is impressed with a right of reimbursement for settlement funds
advanced if it is ultimately determined that the settled claim was not covered.
Because the foundation of reimbursement is consent by the policyholder, if the
insurer fails to include a reimbursement provision in its reservation of rights
letter, the insurer is denied reimbursement.' 28
126 Ins. Co. of the W. v. Haralambros Beverage, 241 Cal. Rptr. 427 (Ct. App. 1987):
With respect to equitable restitution, the general rule is that money voluntarily paid to another
with knowledge of the facts cannot be recovered back. [In Lesher v. Travelers Insurance Com-
pany], the court denied an insurer equitable restitution of litigation costs, finding its primary
motivation in defending under a reservation of rights was to protect its own interests and not
those of its insured.
Id. at 434 (citation omitted), disapproved on other grounds in Buss v. Superior Court, 939
P.2d 766, 766 (Cal. 1997); cf 1776 K Street Assoc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 354 (Ct. Cl.
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980) (holding that no restitution allowed when mistake
is simply one of judgment).
127 Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 126 Cal. Rptr. 267, 274 (Ct. App.
1975):
Absent an agreement by the insured - express or implied in fact - that the insurer may commit
the insured's own fund toward any reasonable settlement, the insurer is not permitted to seek
reimbursement for a particular settlement unless it has secured specific authority to make that
settlement or has notified the insured of a reasonable offer by the claimant and given the insured
an opportunity to assume the defense.
Id. at 267. In a bilateral "no waiver" agreement, reimbursement is clearly the result of
mutual assent.
128 Gossard v. Ohio Cas. Group, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190 (Ct. App. 1995) (upholding fight of
reimbursement of defense costs when (1) the insurer defended under a reservation of rights
with a specific reimbursement provision; (2) there was a declaration of non-coverage; and
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Tying reimbursement to the policyholder's consent is based on a view of
the insurer's ability to maintain a conditional defense that is dated.129 Initial
judicial approaches to unilateral efforts by insurers to defend conditionally
were cautious. Courts were no doubt more comfortable with bilateral
approaches, such as "no waiver" agreements.' 3° To uphold unilateral asser-
tions of conditional defenses, courts imposed a "consent by acquiescence" ele-
ment. Because the policyholder could reject a conditional defense and force
the insurer to either defend unconditionally or decline the tender, courts treated
the policyholder's silence in the face of the tender of a conditional defense as
the functional equivalent of an acceptance. Within this model it made sense to
require that if the insurer wished reimbursement for funds paid to settle a claim,
the insurer must state its desire for reimbursement and the terms of the defense
in the reservation of rights letter so that the policyholder could "assent" to it,
albeit if only by silence, or reject the defense and put the insurer to an election.
As conflict of interest issues generated by conditional defenses became
more common between insurers and policyholders, the idea that a conditional
defense was consensual began to fade. Increasingly, courts have upheld the
right of the insurer to defend conditionally.' Within a right-based model it is
difficult to fix a notion of policyholder consent. If the insurer has the right to
defend conditionally, it is erroneous to suggest that the policyholder's "con-
sent" plays a role in the exercise of that right. Disclosure has also been justi-
fied under other theories. Failure to disclose a conditional defense has been
(3) the policyholder never objected to either the conditional defense or the reimbursement
provision and by so doing acquiesced in the insurer's position), hearing granted, appeal
dismissed, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106 (Cal. 1995); republished by 909 P.2d 1 (1995). It is unclear
whether a right to reimbursement can be imposed unilaterally by the conditionally defending
insurer to the same extent as the conditional defense may be imposed unilaterally by the
insurer. Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n of Mass. v. Goldberg, 680 N.E.2d
1121, 1129 (Mass. 1997); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 534 (Ct.
App. 1996). Alternatively, the insurer may secure reimbursement from the policyholder fol-
lowing settlement if the insurer received "specific authority" from the policyholder to settle
after the insurer defended conditionally. Md. Cas. Co. v. Imperial Contracting Co., 260 Cal.
Rptr. 797, 804 (Ct. App. 1989).
129 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. More recent decisions rely on principles
of unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacobs, 22 P.3d 313, 319-20 (Cal.
2001).
130 Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. at 272-73, (quoting 68 HARV. L. Rav.
1436, 1446-47):
The distinction between a non-waiver agreement and a reservation of rights has been stated as
follows: ". . . A non-waiver agreement is a bilateral contract, normally in writing, entered into
by the assured and the insurer after the accident, providing that the insurer will defend the tort
suit while reserving its right to assert non-liability under the policy at a later date .... A
reservation of rights is very similar to a non-waiver agreement, and it is subject to the same
limitations and restrictions. It differs in being less formal than the non-waiver and less tied to
strict contract principles. The insurer need only notify, or attempt to notify, the assured that it is
conducting the investigation and defense of the tort claim under a reservation of the right to
assert policy defenses at a later time, and the assured's silence will usually be deemed acquies-
cence. Courts have in general been fairly liberal in implying reservations.
(citations omitted).
131 See supra note 89.
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held to "estop" the insurer;' 3 2 alternatively, the insurer has been held to have
"waived" its rights.' 33 While both theories are closer to an insurer-right based
model, in practice courts have frequently stretched the concepts to achieve a
result closer to the policyholder consent model.
134
That reservation of rights letters should be treated as free from a "consent
by the policyholder condition" does not mean that an insurer should be given
carte blanche with respect to the conduct of its conditional defense. The
insurer's actions under the contract are subject to the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.' 35 The insurer cannot use the reservation of rights letter
for strategic reasons unrelated to its legitimate belief that a coverage issue is
present. 136 Thus, the insurer cannot interpose a conditional defense absent the
good faith belief, at the time of the assertion of the reservation, that a coverage
issue exists. A court could require (1) for evidentiary reasons, (2) to prevent
future credibility contests, (3) to reduce the need for judicial dispute resolution,
or (4) to prevent insurers from exploiting their control of the defense to find
coverage defenses, that the basis and terms of the conditional defense be placed
in the reservation of rights letter. 137 These practical reasons are, however, dif-
ferent from the bargain theory that generally has been used to date to support
the reimbursement disclosure requirement.'
38
The policyholder's rights are not directly affected by the presence or
absence of a disclosure requirement unless the policyholder can object and put
the insurer to an election. The recent trend of decisions suggests that a policy-
holder cannot reject a conditional defense with a right of reimbursement.' 39
132 Draft Systems, Inc. v. Alspach, 756 F.2d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing C. J.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE §§ 4689, 4694 (W. Berdal ed., 1979)).
133 Protective Ins. Co. v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., Indianapolis, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 656, 661
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
131 Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1559 (9th Cir. 1991)
(noting that in insurance context the line between waiver and estoppel has been blurred);
KEETON & WrmsS, INSURANCE LAW, supra note 34.
135 Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. George, 953 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1997) (noting but not deciding that
insurer could abuse its right to defend conditionally by requesting a court to determine cov-
erage issues); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499, 504-05 (Wash. 1992) (holding
that insurer that conducts conditional defense in bad faith loses privilege to contest
coverage).
136 Am. Eagle Ins. Co. v. Nettleton, 932 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding that an
insurer has a right to provide a conditional defense "only when [it] has a good faith belief
that the complaint alleges conduct which may not be covered by the policy").
137 Courts have imposed such a requirement that has, in turn, generated a discrete body of
law of estoppel and waiver regarding insurer efforts to augment the reasons given in the
reservation of rights letter to defend conditionally. JERRY, supra note 1, at 798.
138 Courts using the principle of unjust enrichment to support reimbursement have used a
"demand" requirement to effect disclosure to the insured of the insurer's claim for reim-
bursement when defending conditionally. Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacobs, 22 P.3d 313, 320
(Cal. 2001).
139 The traditional ground for requiring disclosure of the bases of the conditional defense is
to permit the policyholder to be aware of potential conflicts of interest that would permit the
policyholder to assume control of the defense. Cowan v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 318 N.E.2d
315, 320-22 (111. Ct. App. 1974). The modem trend appears to be to not limit the insurer to
the defenses listed in the reservation of rights letter unless the policyholder can show that
less than full disclosure actually caused the policyholder prejudice. See Intel Corp., 952
F.2d at 1560-61.
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This strongly suggests that the consent model is ill-suited to the present way
courts are treating conditional defenses by insurers.
The consent model has also caused courts to undervalue the role of restitu-
tion as a basis for supporting reimbursement by the policyholder of the monies
advanced by the insurer to settle the claim. Under the consent model, the par-
ties have, from the court's perspective, contractually adjusted their rights and
duties. Restitution may be seen as an improper intrusion into the parties' pri-
vate arrangements when consent is the basis of the obligation."14 However, if
the insurer is permitted to exercise unilaterally the right to a conditional
defense, the use of consent as legitimizing the insurer's conduct is undermined.
On the other hand, absent consent, the insurer's action may benefit the policy-
holder in a manner that requires adjustment to avoid the policyholder's unjust
enrichment. For example, if the claim is not covered, the policyholder would
receive a windfall in the form of an extra-contractual benefit were the insurer
denied reimbursement of settlement funds. The policyholder would receive
coverage not paid for and perhaps not even capable of being given. 141 This is a
classic case for restitution. Indeed, restitution is frequently recognized in the
insurance context in situations that are strikingly parallel to the conditional
defense case. 1
42
When the insurer exercises the right to defend conditionally, under what
circumstances should the insurer be allowed reimbursement for advancing
funds to settle the suit? If the insurer is taking the position, through the reim-
bursement request, that settlement is ultimately the policyholder's responsibil-
ity, fairness concerns may suggest that the policyholder be allowed some
control over the ultimate obligation to be imposed. This may be characterized
140 This is a common theme in contract and unjust enrichment law. FISCHER, supra note 58,
at §53 (e).
141 For example, indemnification for injury intentionally inflicted by the policyholder may
violate the public policy of the jurisdiction. See KEETON & WIDIss, supra note 34, §5.4(d);
JERRY, supra note 1, § 63C.
142 Contribution is frequently allowed when the insurer has paid more than its proportionate
share of an obligation to which other insurers are co-obligors. See, e.g., Cincinnati Cos. v.
W. Am. Ins. Co., 679 N.E.2d 91, 94 (I11. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that "[t]he fact that an
insurer undertakes the burden of a full settlement payment prior to a possible judgment does
not mean that the insurer is a volunteer and the insurer, therefore, is not precluded from
recovering contribution from other insurers liable for the same loss") (citation omitted); cf
Md. Cas. Co. v. Bailey & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 519, 523-33 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that statutory bar against contribution or indemnity when less than all persons responsible for
a loss enter into a good faith settlement with the plaintiff did not operate to bar claim for
contribution by paying insurer against other non-paying insurers). In Buss v. Superior
Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997), the California Supreme Court relied exclusively on princi-
ples of unjust enrichment and restitution to accommodate the interests of the insurer and the
policyholder when the insurer assumed the defense of both covered and uncovered claims
because of the broad duty to defend rule applied in California. Douglas Richmond, Reim-
bursing Insurers' Defense Costs: Restitution and Mixed Actions, 35 SAN DinGo L. REV. 457
(1998) (discussing Buss and its reliance on principles of unjust enrichment and restitution to
allocate responsibility for defense costs when the insurer assumes the defense of the entire
suit because one but not all of the claims are subject to a duty to defend). Compare Sho-
shone First Bank v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 510 (Wyo. 2000) (rejecting Buss alloca-
tion because the policyholder did not contractually agree to reimburse the insurer for
defending uncovered claims).
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as the "informed consent" model. 14 3 An alternative model would permit the
insurer to settle for the policyholder's account, subject only to requirements of
reasonableness and good faith. This model is analogous to the approach used
in the insurer-breach cases discussed earlier. I would characterize this as the
"reasonableness" model.
Neither the "informed consent" nor the "reasonableness" model is neces-
sarily dictated by use of the consent or restitution theories. The availability of
restitution is frequently conditioned on whether the person benefited was
deprived of an opportunity to bargain for the benefit. This position is based on
the understanding that any meaningful evaluation of whether one was deprived
of an opportunity to bargain would require an after-the-fact analysis of whether
one would have bargained, and to what resolution, if one had been aware of the
relevant facts and circumstances at the time disclosure should have been made.
This characterization would support use of the "informed consent" model even
if reimbursement were based on restitution rather than consent. "
The use of the "informed consent" model is stronger if reimbursement is
based on consent. The consent theory is essentially based on the fiction of an
agreement and is more properly seen as resting on an accommodation of the
conflicting interests to the parties.' 45 To speak of "implied" consent based on
policyholder silence, as is often the case in this context, is to substitute a duty
to speak for a right to contract. A duty to act necessarily presupposes a judicial
assumption that it is reasonable to require policyholder action and to assign
legal consequences to policyholder inaction. To require a party to speak sug-
gests that the party's decision to speak or not to speak should be based on an
informed awareness of the facts of the issue that party must address when and if
the party speaks.
The idea that the party who will ultimately bear the cost of the settlement
ought to have a meaningful role in a decision affecting its interests is appealing;
nonetheless, on consideration of all the factors, a reasonableness test is superior
to an informed consent test. Giving the party not in control of the defense a
role in the settlement process will invariably complicate settlement negotia-
tions. In order to give meaningful consent, the party not in control of the
defense must have access to the same kind and quality of information the party
in control possesses; otherwise, consent is hardly "informed." Even if the party
143 Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 266 (Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that conditionally defending insurer could not receive reimbursement for reasonable
settlement of non-covered claim when insurer failed to give the policyholder the opportunity
to reject the settlement); L & S Roofing Supply Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
521 So. 2d 1298, 1303 (Ala. 1987) (stating that because "it is the insured who may pay any
judgment or settlement, . . . it is the insured who must make the ultimate choice regarding
settlement"). Courts adopting this approach have intimated that if the policyholder refuses to
consent to a reasonable settlement negotiated by the insurer, control of the defense may be
transferred to the policyholder, Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242, or the insurer
may seek court approval that would bind the policyholder, Maryland Cas. Co. v. Imperial
Contracting Co., 260 Cal. Rptr. 797, 804 (Ct. App. 1989).
144 This probably accounts for the inclusion of a "demand" requirement when reimburse-
ment is based on unjust enrichment rather than consent. See supra note 138.
145 This fiction is not as counterintuitive as many legal fictions, but we should not forget
that the consent theory is based on fiction, not fact.
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in control is willing to share the information, the other party's risk threshold
may differ substantially from that of the party in control of the defense.
Involvement of a third party may also compromise the confidentiality of mater-
ials prepared by and for the party in control of the defense. Sharing privileged
information with independent third parties is often deemed by courts to consti-
tute a waiver or surrender of the privilege.14 6
The simple fact that a completed settlement would require both insurer
and policyholder assent before it was funded would necessarily make negotia-
tion with the claimant more difficult. Even though the consent is limited to the
value of the claim, the linkage between the consent and the ability to seek
reimbursement by establishing that the settled claim is covered or not covered
is evident. The weaker the coverage claim, the greater the incentive of the
policyholder to withhold consent when the insurer is in control of the defense.
The stronger the coverage claim, the greater the incentive of the insurer to
withhold consent when the policyholder is in control. In each situation, the
party with the power to consent may hope that by withholding consent it can
exploit the desire of the party in control of the defense to settle with the claim-
ant and then use the settling party's failure to secure consent as a defense to
reimbursement. In each case, the party that anticipates it will ultimately bear
the financial burden of the settlement often has an interest in delaying that day
of reckoning. 14 7 Time is money and delay can be profitable given the use value
of money and the uncertainty of litigation.
Conferring on a party the power to frustrate or complicate settlement
raises the likelihood that in a significant number of cases that party will with-
hold consent, when consent should be given, in order to advance its own self-
interest, i.e., for strategic reasons separate from the reasonableness of the settle-
ment. Courts, when called on to determine the validity and enforceability of the
settlement, will invariably ask whether the consent was unreasonably withheld,
which brings us back to a basic reasonableness test. Of course, the two
approaches are not identical, else no one would ever bargain for consent provi-
sions. The presence of a consent provision necessarily suggests more discre-
tion on the party of the right-holder to give or withhold consent than under a
pure reasonableness test. It also suggests a viewpoint (reasonable to the con-
sent giver) that is different from that of the courts applying a general, contex-
146 See Weil v. Inv. Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981);
PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 9.22 (1993) (discuss-
ing express and implied waivers). Whether the concept of waiver should be applied when
information is shared between the policyholder and the insurer has produced inconsistent
decisions. James Fischer, The Attorney-Client Privilege Meets the Common Interest
Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information For Mutual Gain, 16
REV. LITIG. 631 (1997).
147 The policyholder may withhold its consent even though it believes the insurer will ulti-
mately be responsible for the claim (i.e., the claim is covered under the insurance contract)
because it may not wish to encourage the insurer to pursue post-settlement litigation over
coverage. Both the insurer and the policyholder may have different risk aversion thresholds
regarding both the underlying liability claim and the coverage claim. To the extent the
policyholder lacks confidence in the willingness of the insurer to be candid with the policy-
holder in evaluating the claim and in sharing information, the policyholder may prefer a
neutral position regarding the settlement rather than accepting a position that reorients the
litigation to one in which the policyholder must now assume an active role.
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tual reasonableness standard (reasonable given all the facts and circumstances).
Nonetheless, these differences do not warrant a preference for the consent
model given the strategic disadvantages the consent model engenders.
Under the reasonableness model, the party in control makes a settlement
decision based on its evaluation of the claim's expected value. That party may
seek input or assent from the reimbursing party but, in the absence of a contract
provision requiring notice, cooperation, assistance, or consent, the party in con-
trol should not be required to do so as a condition for securing reimbursement.
I do not want to suggest that the choice is easy, for it is not. For example,
in the context of the conditionally defending insurer in control of the defense,
requiring consent and vesting discretion whether to give consent in the policy-
holder is a plausible alternative. The insurer assumed some risk that it would
not be able to protect fully its financial interests, as determined by the coverage
provisions, when it elected to defend conditionally. In effect, the conditional
defense permitted the insurer to protect its policy limits by retaining control of
the defense, albeit at some risk to its coverage position regarding indemnity.
The issue, however, is not simply plausibility, but the better of two possible
resolutions. In this context, the "reasonableness" position is simply superior to
the "informed consent" position given the context in which the positions must
be judged.
The superiority of the "reasonableness" position may also be observed
once we recognize that there is no reason to treat decisional errors by policy-
holders different from decisional errors by insurers. Let us stipulate that the
conditionally defending insurer has erred and the claim is covered. Is the
insurer's error meaningfully different from the converse case of a policy-
holder's error in refusing to consent because the policyholder erroneously
believes the settlement is unreasonable, and results in an "excess settlement
offer" judgment? It is the nature of a conditional defense that one of the parties
will be wrong in its decision-making position and the consequences of error
must be assigned. There is no a priori reason to favor the insurer or the policy-
holder based on their erroneous decisions, particularly when neither is in breach
and thus "fault" cannot be used as a risk allocating factor. Resolution of the
issue should be based on factors independent of the party's erroneous, but good
faith, decision-making. If coverage considerations are not pertinent to allocat-
ing decisional responsibility for the settlement, there is no reason to give the
party not in control of the defense a right to involve itself in the decision to
settle.
Reasonable protection is provided by vesting control of defense authority
in a conditionally defending insurer and requiring a showing of reasonableness
and good faith in settlement to obtain reimbursement from a policyholder on an
uncovered claim. The "reasonableness" requirement limits the ability of the
insurer to escape a costly defense by simply throwing money at the claimant.
The fact that the claimant overvalues the claim does not mean that the insurer
can pay a premium to resolve the dispute. Reasonableness and good faith also
mean that the insurer's claim valuation cannot include the cost of a continued
defense if the insurer wishes to receive reimbursement. The insurer can, of
course, decide to settle because the costs of defense are disproportionate to the
expected value of the claim, but the insurer who does so settles for its own
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account. When the insurer settles for more than the claim's reasonable
expected value, the insurer should not be allowed to transfer that risk to the
policyholder; otherwise, the insurer would be devaluing its promised
defense. 148 Reasonableness in this setting thus focuses solely on the value of
the claim without regard to the costs of litigation. This is distinct from the
approach of a rational litigant who would not differentiate between defense
costs and indemnity costs in deciding whether a settlement was preferable to
continued litigation.
More important than the issue of claim value, however, is the reserved
power of both the insurer and the policyholder to litigate claim coverage.
Under the conditional defense model, the parties are not tied to the form of
claim resolution expressed in the settlement; both are free to litigate de novo
the coverage issue. From this perspective, denying the policyholder a right to
participate in the settlement process seems to be the superior solution. If the
claim is covered, the insurer settled for its own account; consequently, keeping
the policyholder out of the process is consistent with the usual unconditional
defense cases. If the claim is not covered, the policyholder does have exposure.
Exposure is, however, proportionate to the likelihood that the claim is covered.
Exposure increases as the probabilities increase that the claim is not covered.
Proportionality provides two insights into the resolution of the dilemma.
First, we may note that as long as there is a realistic probability that the
claim is covered, the insurer has a strong incentive to bargain effectively to
reach a reasonable compromise of the claim. We may also note that the inter-
ests of the insurer and the policyholder are aligned. In the majority of cases,
both wish to settle the claim for as little as possible. While the insurer and the
policyholder may disagree as to where the case should settle on the range of
reasonable outcomes, the fact remains that the disagreement is usually only one
of degree. This alignment of interests, in the sense that the settlement be rea-
sonable, helps assure that the policyholder's interests are protected because the
insurer's self-interested acts are coherent with and thus will also further the
policyholder's legitimate interests. In this sense, the policyholder's interests are
represented by the insurer in negotiating settlement value with the claimant. 149
Second, as the interests of the insurer and the policyholder diverge
because it becomes increasingly likely the claim is not covered, the justness of
siting final responsibility for the payment of the claim with the policyholder
increases even though the insurer is in control of the defense. This results not
solely from the fact that the parties bargained that the policyholder rather than
the insurer would assume the risk and economic costs of the non-covered
claim, but also from the fact that a cause of the difficulty was the tender of the
non-covered claim to the insurer. While insurance law has developed a set of
rules that encourage insurers to assume their policyholders' defense in doubtful
cases, we should hesitate before we craft rules that create overly generous
incentives for policyholders to tender highly doubtful claims. The strengths of
the coverage claim will be reflected in the insurer's approach to reimbursement.
148 Whether the insurer or policyholder who settles for more than is reasonable should be
denied any reimbursement versus partial reimbursement, i.e. the amount of a reasonable
settlement, is not addressed by this paper.
149 See UNR Indus., Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 942 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1991).
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The insurer should be expected to seek reimbursement only in those cases
where the claim of coverage was weak. Litigation with a policyholder is not
costless. There must be a reasonable prospect of a satisfactory return on the
investment in litigation with the policyholder, regarding reimbursement of
money paid by the insurer to fund a settlement, for the investment to be
worthwhile.
VII. UNSATISFACTORY ALTERNATIVES
There are several alternatives to the position that the obligation to fund a
settlement, subject to reimbursement, should be aligned with the right to con-
trol the defense. One approach would be a model that assigns funding obliga-
tions to each party's exposure.15 ° The right and power to settle would follow
each party's actual exposure. The settlement interest is bifurcated into a cov-
ered exposure, which is assigned to the insurer, and a non-covered exposure,
which is assigned to the policyholder. Each party may settle its own exposure
but may not, without the consent of the other, settle the other' s exposure for the
other's account. Any settlement is essentially made at the risk that the cover-
age position of the settling party is incorrect.
There is a symmetry to this approach that is appealing; however, on full
reflection I believe that the approach is unsupportable. First, the position is
predicated on the assumption that control and settlement are divisible and inde-
pendent. While I do not reject the position conceptually, I have argued in this
paper that in actual practice the distinction is impossible to maintain.''
Second, the approach is based on certainty. It assumes that the coverage
and non-coverage exposures are defined. In some cases this may be true, as,
for example, in cases of excess limits exposures. 152 In many other cases, how-
ever, the identification of the claim as covered or non-covered is more prob-
lematic, as, for example, in the alleged assault case discussed in Part IV.' 5 3 If
funding is deferred until coverage is determined, the ability to achieve claim
closure will be impaired. The essential premise of this paper is that the public
interest in achieving claim closure, the settlement of claims, and the payment of
settlements to claimants often trumps the individual interests of either the poli-
cyholder or the insurer in deferring funding until the limits of coverage have
150 Keeton, supra note 4; Barker, supra note 20.
151 See supra VI A.
152 Keeton presented the coverage/non-coverage model in the context of a policyholder who
was faced with extracontractual liability due to the insurer's refusal to accept a "within
limits" offer that would shield the policyholder from his exposure. Barker has argued, how-
ever, that the Keeton approach should be applied to the non-breach, non-standard cases
generally:
My view, developed in my paper on Insurer Control of Settlement (an unpublished update of
Settling without the Insurer's consent), is that partial coverage or uncertain coverage situations
generate bifurcated settlement interests: the covered exposure and the non-covered exposure.
Each interest may be unilaterally settled by the party bearing that exposure, if the plaintiff is
willing to make such a partial settlement. Neither insurer nor insured may commit the other's
funds. While that complicates settlement, I see no reason to inflate loss costs simply to facilitate
settlements.
153 See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
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been adjudicated. That public policy cannot be unlimited, however, else we
would simply assign the funding obligation to the deeper pocket. The assign-
ment of the funding obligation, with a right of reimbursement, to the party in
control of the defense presents a workable balancing of the competing interests
and complements the conditional defense model the courts have developed to
reconcile the conflicts that may arise under the now separated promises to
defend and to indemnify.
A different approach, suggested in Golden Eagle Insurance Co. v. Fore-
most Insurance Co.,54 is that when the party in control is not settling for its
own account, it must secure the consent of the ultimately responsible party to
the settlement for the settlement to be binding on that party. If, however, the
other party withholds its consent, the duty to defend may be transferred to that
other party. This approach cannot be rejected out-of-hand for again there is a
sense of symmetry and fairness to it. The problem, however, is that it creates
an "implied right to consent" to a situation as to which the insurance contract is
silent. That alone might not be a deciding factor, for this paper has recognized
that the "unprovided for" features of the non-breach, non-standard cases might
require the imposition of reasonable default rules. The larger difficulty with
the "transfer of control" approach is that it is not really a solution. Transferring
control of the defense is not a simple act. It will often require the consent of
others, such as the trial court, and that consent may not be forthcoming. More-
over, there have been significant problems when consent provisions are
expressly set forth in the insurance contract. It would be extremely difficult to
provide a comprehensive default rule that would address the myriad possibili-
ties that could arise when the "implied consent" term is activated.15 5 In prac-
tice, it is no more efficient to decouple "consent" from "control" than it is to
decouple "funding" from "control."
Lastly, the court in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Imperial Contracting Co. 156
suggested that a party could seek judicial approval of the settlement whenever
it was settling for another's account and the other refused to consent. If the
court approved, the settlement would bind the other. This approach has much
to commend because it gives all affected parties an opportunity to present their
claims and contentions before a neutral party for resolution. That benefit is,
however, what makes its availability unlikely in practice. Courts have proven
to be notoriously reluctant to allow the parties to the insurance contract to
obtain judicial declarations of coverage while the underlying claim is being
litigated.' 57 Moreover, even if all parties agree to judicial resolution, which is
154 See supra note 142.
155 For example, a default rule would have to address what a transfer of control would
entail? Would it include the duty to pay for defense costs? How should the costs of rejec-
tion be allocated if the claimant recovers an award larger than the rejected settlement? What
happens if the party or person succeeding to control secures a defense verdict or an award
lower than the rejected settlement? The range of possibilities the default rule would have to
encompass suggests that it would be a poor approach to the problem. The rule would tend to
be "ad hoc" and provide little guidance to the insurer or policyholder.
"I Supra note 129.
157 Pryor, supra note 36, at 24 (noting that "[m]ost courts disallow the simultaneous adjudi-
cation of the duty to defend on the basis of extrinsic facts when those facts overlap with facts
at issue in the tort suit") (footnote omitted).
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certainly not a given in light of the parties' competing interests and the hyper-
adversarial manner of modem civil litigation, the size and scope of the
"approval" litigation will likely duplicate the "reimbursement" litigation. All
this proposal does is delay funding until the coverage litigation is concluded. If
all the parties will agree to that delay, the Maryland Casualty Co. approach has
merit, but in those cases no rule is needed because the parties' interests will
encourage them to secure the desired efficient resolution. In other cases, post-
poning funding will likely lead to the frustration of settlement or the hobbling
of settlements in order to increase the cost of an erroneous rejection. For exam-
ple, to encourage an insurer to give its consent to a settlement, the claimant and
the policyholder may propose an alternative, default settlement that will cost
the insurer dearly if the insurer's non-coverage position is rejected by the
court.158 While I do not minimize the prospect that such alignments will occur
naturally, I do not believe that such opportunistic alliances should be
encouraged by legal rules. Rather, the legal regime should strive to create rules
that are consistent with the natural interests of the parties to the conflict and
advance their mutual interests.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Locating the duty to fund a settlement in the non-standard case, when the
insurer has not agreed to provide an unconditional defense, requires a careful
balancing of the rights and duties presented by the insurer's promise to defend
and indemnify the policyholder. Each of the non-standard cases presents a dif-
ferent case for assigning the duty to fund settlements to either the insurer or the
policyholder.
In the insurer-breach case, the courts have consistently limited the breach-
ing insurer's ability to achieve a post-settlement/post-judgment position that
would be superior to that of the unconditionally defending insurer. In the
insurer-breach case, the issue of "funding" does not arise because the insurer's
breach has taken the insurer out of play. The insurer's breach makes the fund-
ing issue meaningless because the insurer has clearly manifested its position
that it has no obligations to the policyholder under the insurance contract inso-
far as the settled claim is concerned. The issue has always been whether the
insurer-breach case should be a model for the other non-standard cases. I have
argued in this paper that it should not. In the non-breach, non-standard cases,
the duty to fund should follow actual control of the defense, with a right of
reimbursement for reasonable settlement expenditures if it is determined that
the party in control of the defense was not contractually obligated to absorb the
indemnity cost of the claim.
When the policyholder or the insurer is in control pursuant to the insur-
ance contract, the preferable view is also to use a reasonableness standard. The
parties have specifically bargained for control of the defense. Whether settle-
158 I do not want to suggest that this approach is improper. The alternative settlement may
be much greater in amount reflecting the delay in and uncertainty of receipt of payment. On
the other hand, the alternative settlement may be unreasonable, fraudulent, or collusive. This
has proven to be a difficult area of the law for insurers. See supra notes 79-81 and accompa-
nying text.
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ment is seen as a part of the defense obligation or the indemnity obligation, the
basic fact is that the contract provides for reimbursement when the policyholder
contractually exercises control over the defense or reimbursement reflects a
measured balancing of competing interests when the conditionally defending
insurer controls the defense.
The more difficult case is presented by the conflict cases which are
resolved by divesting the insurer of its right to control the defense and transfer-
ring it to the policyholder. This situation does not, however, really differ from
the insurer control cases. Whatever impracticalities and inefficiencies attend to
securing a policyholder's consent in the insurer control case also exist in the
divestment of control cases when the policyholder has assumed control and the
issue becomes insurer consent. Indeed, the existence of a coverage conflict
may exacerbate the situation and make cooperation more difficult. In these
cases, settlement funding obligations should be sited in the party in control of
the defense. Reimbursement should be subject to the test whether the settle-
ment was reasonable. This assumes, of course, that the claims settled are deter-
mined to be within coverage.' 59 While this may result, in the policyholder in
control cases, in some hollowing out of the benefits of coverage, that view is
dependent on acceptance of the position that the insurer should bear the risk
that it may be advancing funds to pay non-covered claims. It is only here that
citing the funding requirement in the insurer not in control of the defense will
have a real bite. If the coverage claim is well founded, it may be expected that
claimants will accept "subject to" settlements and defer payment until the cov-
erage issue is resolved. Conversely, if coverage is doubtful, the prospect
increases that claimants and policyholders will see that their interests are jointly
adverse to the insurer. Imposing a funding obligation on the insurer in this
context raises obvious problems regarding the likelihood that the insurer's
interest were represented in the settlement negotiations leading to claim
valuation.
159 If the settlement involves covered and non-covered claims, an allocation will be
required. The forms of allocation are beyond the scope of this paper. The issue arises,
however, with some frequency in Directors & Officers insurance coverage cases. In this
area courts have used two formulas to allocate. First, the "relative liability exposure"
approach which allocates as the test implies based on the relative exposure or proportionate
fault as presented by the covered and non-covered claims, the assumption being that the
relative exposure is reflected in the settlement. Second, the "larger settlement" test allocates
based on the extent to which the non-covered claims increased, added to, or enhanced the
loss. The allocation is thus determined by dividing the settlement between the basic loss and
the enhanced loss, if any.
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